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Abstract
Each year, crowd disasters happen in different areas of the world. How and why do
such disasters happen? Are the fatalities caused by relentless behavior of people or a
psychological state of panic that makes the crowd ‘go mad’? Or are they a tragic
consequence of a breakdown of coordination? These and other questions are
addressed, based on a qualitative analysis of publicly available videos and materials,
which document the planning and organization of the Love Parade in Duisburg,
Germany, and the crowd disaster on July 24, 2010. Our analysis reveals a number of
misunderstandings that have widely spread. We also provide a new perspective on
concepts such as ‘intentional pushing’, ‘mass panic’, ‘stampede’, and ‘crowd crushes’.
The focus of our analysis is on the contributing causal factors and their mutual
interdependencies, not on legal issues or the judgment of personal or institutional
responsibilities. Video recordings show that people stumbled and piled up due to a
‘domino effect’, resulting from a phenomenon called ‘crowd turbulence’ or ‘crowd
quake’. Crowd quakes are a typical reason for crowd disasters, to be distinguished
from crowd disasters resulting from ‘mass panic’ or ‘crowd crushes’. In Duisburg,
crowd turbulence was the consequence of amplifying feedback and cascading
effects, which are typical for systemic instabilities. Accordingly, things can go terribly
wrong in spite of no bad intentions from anyone. Comparing the incident in Duisburg
with others, we give recommendations to help prevent future crowd disasters. In
particular, we introduce a new scale to assess the criticality of conditions in the crowd.
This may allow preventative measures to be taken earlier on. Furthermore, we discuss
the merits and limitations of citizen science for public investigation, considering that
today, almost every event is recorded and reflected in the World Wide Web.
Keywords: crowd disaster; causality network; crowd control; domino effect; crowd
quake; evacuation; cascading effect; systemic risk; instability
1 Introduction
Crowd disasters are known since at least the Roman Empire. As a consequence, building
codes for stadia were developed. The Coliseum in Rome, Italy, which is considered to be
one of the seven world wonders, is probably the best known example of Roman build-
ing experience. While it could take up between , and , visitors, it had more
than  numbered entrances, and visitors exited through the same gate through which
they had entered. In fact, exits were located side by side, around the entire circumference
of the Coliseum. As a consequence, the Coliseum could be evacuated within just about
 minutes, an efficiency that is not even reached by modern stadia due to their smaller
number of exits.
© 2012 Helbing and Mukerji; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Building codes and regulations for mass events have also been written and updated af-
ter recent crowd disasters, such as the ones in Bradford () or Hillsborough, Sheffield
() [–].,,, Today’s knowledge about the dynamics of crowds is considerable and
summarized in Refs. [–]. Furthermore, a lot of experience in organizing safer mass
events has recently been gained from the organization of religious pilgrimage [–]. In
recent years, there is also a quickly growing body of literature on evacuation experiments
[, , –] and pedestrian simulations [, , –], and various related commercial
software products are now available. Thus, how was it possible that  people died and
more than  were injured during the Love Parade on July , ?
A crucial point for the safety of mass events is that they are (or at least should be) or-
ganized in a way that is robust against many kinds of disturbances (such as weather con-
ditions, human errors, etc.). This is why the organization of a mass event includes the
elaboration of contingency plans. Why then can crowd disasters still happen?
This paper will reveal that the Love Parade disaster was not the result of a singlemistake.
We will rather show that the Love Parade disaster resulted from the interaction of several
contributing factors. It is probably the first time that a detailed analysis can be performed
with publicly available documents: not just investigation reports by public authorities,
and the media, but also maps from Google Earth and  degree photographs, videos
accessible through YouTube, documents released by Wikipedia,, and Wikileaks,
and other sources. In some sense, this opens up a new age of public investigation.However,
to avoid misunderstandings, we would like to underline that our analysis focuses on the
course of events and causal interdependencies among them, while they do not draw any
conclusions regarding legal issues or personal or institutional responsibilities, whichmust
be judged by other experts.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section  provides an overview of
the situation before and during the Love Parade disaster. This includes a historical back-
ground, a description of the festival area (including in- and outflows), and a timeline recon-
structed from many video recordings. Section  will analyze various factors contributing
to the disaster, while Section  will focus on causal interdependencies and interaction ef-
fects. Section  discusses our findings and Section  concludes with lessons learned for
the organization of future mass events. The novelty of this paper is four-fold: it concerns
() the structured analysis of large amounts of publicly available video recordings of a dis-
aster, () the interpretation of the disaster as a systemic failure (where the interaction of
various factors created a systemic instability, causing an overall loss of control), () a revi-
sion of common views about crowd disasters, and () the introduction of a scale reflecting
the criticality of crowd conditions (and proposed counter-measures).
2 Overview of the situation
The following section will try to give a short overview of the situation during the Love
Parade in Duisburg and the planning beforehand. A large number of documents are now
publicly available (see collection of links). This includes the planning documents, the
event log of the regulatory authority of the city of Duisburg, and the evacuation analy-
sis. Publicly accessiblematerials and eye witness reports now amount to several hundred
pages and more than  video recordings. This useful collection of materials is the
result of the efforts of many volunteers. It is certainly not possible (but also not the pur-
pose) of this article to give a complete representation of materials. We will rather focus
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on the most relevant details in order to avoid a distraction of the reader from the main
factors that have contributed to the disaster.
The interested reader is invited to gain a more complete picture himself or herself,
based on the media reports provided,, and of several TV channels.,, The view
of the organizer is presented in a video documentation. Further video documentations
are available from private persons.,,, An interpretation of the events, overlaid to a
satellite picture, can be found on YouTube.
In order to make an independent assessment possible, our own analysis will largely re-
fer to authentic materials that are publicly accessible. Videos of a subset of surveillance
cameras are available until :.
Timelines can be found in the endnotes.,, Complementary to this article, we pro-
vide a time-ordered and geo-located collection of videos from visitors of the Love Pa-
rade. A YouTube channel with videos of the Love Parade exists as well. The collection
contains further videos. Many of these videos have been synchronized,, and some of
them have been cut together in the form of multi-view videos documenting the course
of events. A set of highly relevant private videos around the time of the disaster can be
found on YouTube.,,,,,,,,,,
Note that, when referring to secondary sources (such as public media reports), we will
sometimes use wordings such as ‘apparently’ or ‘seems to’, in order to indicate that access
to primary sources would be desirable for an in-depth analysis.
2.1 History of the Love Parade
The Love Parade is a popular electronic dance music festival in Germany that was first
organized in Berlin in , and annually repeated in the same city until . The events
in  and  had to be cancelled because of funding problems and a coordinated
opposition of political parties (e.g. related to thewaste resulting from the event). In ,
the parade made a comeback with the support of a fitness studio. The Love Parade in
summer was again planned for Berlin, but the eventwas cancelled, since the Senate of
Berlin did not issue the necessary permits on time. After negotiationswith several German
cities, it was then decided to move the Love Parade to the Ruhr Area, an agglomerate of
major German cities, in the next years. The first of these events took place in Essen on
August , , with .million visitors. In July , it was organized inDortmund. The
 event, planned for Bochum, was cancelled due to security concerns, particularly as
a critical situation had apparently occurred the year before. The last Love Parade took
place on July , , in Duisburg, where  people died andmore than  were injured
in a crowd disaster. The chain of events underlying this disaster will be analyzed in the
following sections.
2.2 Description of the festival area
The festival area of the Love Parade in  was approximately , square meters
large and located in the area of a previous freight station of the city of Duisburg. For a
 degree view of the festival area and its surroundings see the endnotes. In contrast to
the open area concept of the Love Parade in Berlin (see the picture in the endnotes), the
annual Carnival in Cologne, and the th World Youth Day gathering with the Catholic
Pope in  in Cologne-Marienfeld, Germany, the festival area was constrained by
railway tracks on the East and by a freeway on the West. In response to concerns from
Helbing and Mukerji EPJ Data Science 2012, 1:7 Page 4 of 40
http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/1/1/7
the regulatory authority that the area would be too small for the expected number of up
to . million expected visitors, the city of Duisburg combined its late approval of the
event with the condition to restrict the number of concurrent visitors to ,.
To overcome security issues seen by the regulatory authority (there was some discus-
sion to cancel the event overall), the organizer of the Love Parade decided to fence the
whole festival area. This moved the responsibility to the building regulatory agency and
required the event to satisfy the ‘Versammlungsstättenverordnung’, which is the German
safety regulation for the organization of mass events. However, there were still concerns
that the standard safety requirements would not be met. It is conceivable that these con-
cerns were not fully considered due to a desire to approve the event, particularly as Duis-
burg was nominated as Germany’s ‘cultural capital’ of the year, and the opinion prevailed
that the Love Parade would make the cultural program and the city more attractive. To
overcome the concerns, an expert opinion was requested from a prominent crowd re-
searcher. The report argued that the festival area could be sufficiently well evacuated in
an emergency situation. However, the study did not analyze normal entry and exit con-
ditions in detail.
Figure  gives an overview of the festival area. It shows that the festival area could be
entered only via a tunnel, ‘Karl-Lehr-Straße’, which also served as the only exit from the
area. In the middle of that tunnel, there is the main ramp that leads to the festival area.
The tunnel and the ramp together determine an inverse T-shaped geometry of in- and
outflows. A side ramp in theWest (‘AmGüterbahnhof ’) was assigned as an additional exit
ramp, but basically not used. The smallest overall diameter of the tunnels in the East and
in the West was about  meters. The ramp itself was  meters wide and  meters
long. Based on themaximum flow value of . persons per meter per second [], this
would imply a hypothetical maximum flow of , persons per hour and a density of
. persons per square meter, if the entire ramp width was usable. However, the actual
capacity was significantly lower than this due to the following factors (see also Sec. .):
 The maximum possible flow is inconvenient and potentially unsafe, and therefore
not suited as a basis for planning [, –].
 Counterflows are expected to reduce the capacity by -% [], resulting in a
maximum hypothetical flow of , persons per hour.
 The  degree turn to and from the tunnels is expected to reduce the capacity as
well.
 Walking in groups reduces the capacity further [].
 Alcohol and drugs are expected to have a negative impact on capacity as well.
 A considerable amount of capacity must have been lost due to fences, a food
stand, and vehicles on the side of the ramp.
The flow model of the organizer assumed numbers in Table .
According to Table , between : and : the organizers expected an inflow of
, and an outflow of , people, which could not have been handled by the wide
ramp without the use of suitable crowd control. Problems had to be expected already for
much smaller flow rates, as there were vehicles and a food stand as well as fences on the
ramp, which must have reduced its capacity considerably. This risk factor certainly had
to be carefully considered by the crowd management concept. In fact, the side ramp (see
Figure ) was attributed as an additional exit ramp, and the organizational concept fore-
saw the possibility to reduce the visitor flows through ‘isolating devices’ (access control
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Figure 1 Illustration of the festival area and the ways to and from the area. Camera positions are shown
as well as locations and events that are relevant for the analysis of this study. Note that the indicated timing of
the police cordons (as reconstructed from video recordings) slightly differs from the police report,6 but the
differences are small.
points), which were located in front of the tunnel entrances. Despite this, access con-
trol was given up intermittently because of the large pressure from incoming visitors (see
the endnote and Tables  to ). The festival area itself was apparently not overcrowded
(see caption of Table  and aerial photographs)., So, why and how did the crowd disas-
ter happen in the inverse T-section formed by the tunnel and the ramp, even though the
visitor flows were apparently smaller than expected (see Table ) and a more than ,
people strong police force was on duty? To address this question, we will first present an
expert opinion on the crowd disaster. Then, we will summarize the course of events, and
analyze the contributing factors in more detail.
2.3 Expert report by Prof. Dr. G. Keith Still
An expert report dated December , , which became public in February , ana-
lyzes the implications of the flow model presented in Table . In the following, we sum-
marize the essence of this report in our own words:
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Table 1 Expected inflows and outflows estimated by the organizers (see endnote55 for more
details)
Time Expected inflow/h Expected outflow/h
14:00-15:00 55,000 10,000
15:00-16:00 55,000 50,000
16:00-17:00 55,000 45,000
17:00-18:00 90,000 55,000
Based on these values, the maximum number of visitors on the festival area was expected to be 235,000 (while a capacity of
250,000 was approved and more than 1 million visitors were expected, according to announcements before and during the
event).60 Estimates based on surveillance videos of camera 13 suggest that the actual flows were considerably below the
values in the above table. According to the endnote,61 the inflow in the time period between 14:00 and 15:00 varied
between 280 and 600 persons per minute and the outflow between 6 and 80 persons per minute. Between 15:00 and 15:40,
it varied between 450 and 750 persons per minute and the outflow between 40 and 250 persons per minute. This is 30-50%
below expectations of the organizer of the Love Parade and implies a maximum number of visitors on the festival area of
about 175,000.
 Safe crowd conditions can be usually assumed for densities up to - persons per
meter and minute and a maximum acceptable flow of  persons per meter and
minute (which is considerably below the maximum possible flow) [].
 All areas, in which higher crowd densities may occur or where many people may
accumulate, must be analyzed for risks.
 The safety concept must list those risks and also, who is responsible to handle them.
The organizational structure (in particular, who takes what kinds of decisions) must
be fixed before the event. Particular attention must be paid to crowd management
and communication (loud speakers, signs, maps and other plans).
 All authorities involved in the organization of the event are responsible for the safety
of the crowd. The division of responsibility should be regulated in the concept of the
event. A mass event should not be approved, if it does not satisfy the applicable
safety regulations.
 The reason for most crowd disasters in the past was a failure to regulate the flow of
people in high throughput areas.
 The organization of an event needs plans for normal operation, but also contingency
plans for all kinds of incidents.
 There are basically three ways of influencing the safety of crowds: design,
information, and crowd management.
 At the Love Parade in Duisburg, the capacity of the main ramp to and from the
festival area was given by the minimum usable width of the ramp. Due to two
triangular fence structures,, which were apparently not shown in the maps, the
effective width of the ramp was only . meters. According to the expert report,
this implies a maximum safe flow of . meters ×  persons per meter and
minute ×  minutes = , persons per hour. However, the maximum expected
flow between : and : was , persons per hour, which would require a
width of . meters. Therefore, at the Love Parade in Duisburg, problems with the
in- and outflows and a critical accumulation of people had to be expected.
 Once the crowd density exceeds between  or  persons per square meter,
congestion can build up quickly, which implies high risks for people to stumble or
fall (particularly if the ground is uneven). Therefore, injuries can easily happen.
 People in a dense crowd cannot see what happens a few meters away from them, and
they are not aware of the pressure in front.
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 The density, noise, and chaos in a dense crowd cause a natural desire to leave the
crowd. Due to a lack of suitable crowd control and guidance, visitors of the Love
Parade in Duisburg could only see a narrow staircase as a possible emergency exit
(see Figure ). When trying to get there, the pressure towards the staircase increased
and eventually triggered the crowd disaster.
The analysis of the effective capacity of themain ramp suggests that problems on the ramp
were foreseeable, and the question arises, why the obstacles were placed there. However,
a complete assessment should also consider the existence of the side ramp (see Figure ).
Moreover, due to the applied access control, the flows on the main ramp did not reach the
expected flows by far. This can be directly concluded from the fact that therewas never any
significant congestion between the two triangular obstacles defining the narrowest part of
the ramp, before the flow was controlled in this area from : on; this is clearly visible
in the surveillance videos. An active bottleneck, in contrast, would be characterized by
the formation of a queue [].
Queues of people did not form in the middle of the ramp, but rather at the upper end,
where visitors were trying to enter the festival area. This, however, is not the location
where the crowd disaster happened. Therefore, while one had to expect problems in the
middle of the ramp where the triangular obstacles were located, the crowd disaster was
actually not caused by those obstacles. The course of events that resulted in the crowd
disaster involved many contributing factors, as we will show in the following. This con-
clusion of our study is in line with a quote referring to the Hillsborough disaster of ,
which apparently goes back to the Archbishop of York and can be found in Keith Still’s
PhD thesis: ‘Events of the magnitude of Hillsborough don’t usually happen just for one
single reason, nor is it usually possible to pin the blame on one single scapegoat. . . . Disas-
ters happen because a whole series of mistakes, misjudgements and mischance happen to
come together in a deadly combinations’. This should be kept in mind when Keith Still’s
expert report on the crowd disaster in Duisburg points out that it is merely based on the
evidence presented to him and that it answers only the questions posed to him.
2.4 Timeline
The chronology presented in Table  is an abbreviated version of the timeline that was
originally provided by the organizers of the Love Parade together with their documen-
tary movie. It is largely supported by the surveillance videos and other public sources.
Additional points will be discussed afterwards.
The video recordings of the surveillance cameras and the related chronology, whichwere
publicly provided by the organizer, end at : (‘in respect of the victims’). Tables  and
 present additional information that is relevant for a reconstruction of the causes of the
crowd disaster. A time-ordered, geo-coded video link collection supplementing this paper
allows the readers to gain an independent impression.
However, we would like to point out that the times provided on the videos or in the
respective video portal may not always be exact. A synchronized video collection is now
also available.
3 Contributing factors
After the occurrence of a disaster, it is natural to ask, who is responsible. In many cases,
people are trying to find one person or organization (the ‘scapegoat’) to blame. In fact,
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Table 2 Timeline according to the organizers of the Love Parade
12:02 The festival area is opened. Visitors can enter the area via the access control points from East
and West via the tunnel.
13:00 The inflow is reduced by closing 10 of 16 isolating devices, both on the East and West entrance
towards the tunnel.
13:45-14:15 No important disturbances or queues of visitor flows occur in the entry area.
Around 14:00 Official start of the Love Parade.
14:15-14:30 The concentration of visitors increases at the end of the entrance ramp towards the festival
area (due to obstructions by ‘floats’, i.e.moving music trucks).
14:30-15:15 The crowd manager tries to order support by the police. The organizer states that the person
responsible for connecting to the police (the ‘liaison officer’) did not have a working walkie
talkie or mobile phone.
14:30-15:06 The visitor flow on the ramp and from the West increases.
Around 15:00 Reduction of the visitor flow by closing as many isolating devices as possible.
15:12-15:34 Change of police shifts.63 5 police cars drive into the ramp area.
15:31 Visitors ignore the fence on the side of the main ramp, following police forces, who have
temporarily opened it. Shortly later, visitors overcome fences also on the other side of the ramp,
which should prevent them from taking the steep slope up to the festival area.
15:50 A first chain of police forces (police cordon) is formed in front of the side ramp, blocking in- and
outflows in the West (see cordon 1a in Figure 1).64
15:50-15:57 A second police cordon closes the tunnel to the East (see cordon 2 in Figure 1).
Around 16:02 There is a sudden strong visitor flow towards the festival area from the West. The first police
cordon is moved behind the side ramp (see cordon 1b in Figure 1).
From 16:02 Police forces start to control the flows to (and from) the festival area in the middle of the ramp
(where the ramp is narrowest due to some fences).65 Queues start to form on both sides of the
resulting bottleneck.66
Around 16:06 There are just a few visitors between the three police cordons.
Around 16:07 A jam of visitors forms in the West part of the tunnel.
Around 16:09 A jam of visitors forms above the chain of police forces on the ramp, when trying to exit the
festival area.
16:12-16:28 The third police cordon is completed (see cordon 3 in Figure 1). It stops the in- and outflows
completely, where the fences narrow down the ramp.
Around 16:13 The small ramp is opened as entrance to the festival area. Visitors climb over fences.
Around 16:14 The second police cordon in the East opens up, and visitors enter the area of the big ramp from
below.67
Around 16:17 First visitors try to enter the festival area via a narrow staircase connecting the lower part of the
ramp with the festival area on top.68 Afterwards, the staircase is blocked by two security
people.69
Around 16:21 The first police cordon in the West dissolves.19,70 The previously waiting visitors move towards
the ramp and encounter there the dense flow of visitors coming from the East.
16:22 First people climb the pole.19,71
16:22-16:24 The third police cordon still keeps the ramp closed, while the pressure increases from both
sides (i.e. inflow and outflow).
16:24-16:28 The third police cordon is dissolved.72
Around 16:27 The narrow staircase is used by people to get up to the festival area.73 Someone climbs on top
of a traffic sign.74
16:31-16:37 A fourth police cordon is formed in the upper area of the ramp.75 At the same time, the density
in the lower area of the ramp increases steadily.
After 16:40 The situation gets out of control. More and more visitors try to get up to the festival area via the
small staircase, the pole and a container (used by the crowd management, located at the lower
end of the ramp in the South).
after the Love Parade disaster, it seems that everybody was blaming everybody else: the
visitors, the organizers, the police, the city of Duisburg.Whatmakes things difficult is that
nobody is totally right and nobody is totally wrong: in the following, we will argue that it
is the interaction of many contributing factors that caused the crowd disaster. Before we
discuss the interaction of these factors, however, let us shedmore light on some of them in
separation.While doing so, we will address a number of hypotheses regarding the cause of
the crowd disaster, which have been formulated after the event. Given the many victims
and pictures reminding of a war zone, some people first thought that a terrorist attack
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Table 3 Further relevant events
8:03 The police receive an e-mail informing them about the official approval of the Love
Parade.19
Until 12:00 The construction work (leveling work) of a bulldozer on the festival ground takes longer
than planned and delays the opening of the festival for approximately one hour.21
13:33 20,000 techno fans are waiting in the West and are creating a lot of pressure to get
in.21,76
13:44 The police are worried that the access point may be overrun.21
Around 14:00 A police officer asks the crowd management to make a loudspeaker announcement,
but this cannot be done, because there is no working loudspeaker equipment despite
requirements to have one.21
After 14:03 Visitors are obstructed by floats (music trucks), while trying to enter the festival area
from the ramp.21,77
14:42 The obstruction by the floats on the festival area causes a jam of arriving visitors on the
ramp almost up to the tunnel.21
14:52 For some time, it is not possible to enter the festival area from the ramp.19
15:06 The minister of interior visits the crisis management team.19
15:30-18:00 Mobile phones do not work due to an overload of the mobile phone networks.21
From 15:31 Visitors start to climb the slope in the West of the main ramp and one minute later in the
East to get to the festival area.78
Around 16:00 Turmoil and critical crowd conditions occur in front of the access points. A policeman
instructs the crowd management to open the access point in the West.21 The access
point in the East is intermittently opened to reduce the pressure in the crowd.21
16:31 A fence at the West side of the tunnel is opened to allow an emergency vehicle to enter.
Hundreds of visitors make use of the occurring gap to enter the tunnel.6
Around 16:30 Visitors overcome fences in the tunnel.79
16:35-16:43 People scream for help and shout at others they should hurry up; some seem to panic,
but others try to calm them down; the situation changes quickly: people change
between screaming and laughing; some people manage to climb the staircase, but
there is still no continuous flow of people on the staircase.80 People scream they are
about to die.81 The traffic sign is already bent.82 People shout from above that those on
the narrow staircase should move on.83
Around 16:36 Crowd turbulence and critical situation around the pole.84
Starting 16:38 Police are limiting the number of people on the staircase (usually 2 or 3 at a time), but
make sure that people do not stop on the staircase.85
Around 16:40 An unconscious women is passed on to the narrow staircase and elevated up.86
A sparse, slowly moving crowd in the tunnel moves towards the festival area.87
Starting approx. 16:40 Police cars in the city make loudspeaker announcements that the festival area is
completely full and will not be accessible to further visitors anymore until the end of the
day.88
Around 16:44 Some people climb a pole and the narrow staircase next to the ramp (see Figure 1).
Several people try to elevate themselves from the crowd by climbing a billboard. Many
seem to be in trouble between the staircase and the tunnel.89
16:47 Interview with the Love Parade organizer, who does not seem to be aware how critical
the situation is.60
Around 16:48 A command is given to stop inflows to the tunnel and the ramp area completely. It is
executed within minutes.21 Sound of police sirens; some people have fallen to the
ground and raise their hands into the air for help.90
Around 16:50 An emergency vehicle is entering the ramp area through the tunnel and opens its
sliding door. An interaction between the crowd and people in the emergency vehicle
takes place. The trouble between the staircase and tunnel is becoming more and more
serious.91 A video from the West looking down on the crowd shows shockwaves in the
crowd. Police forces are having a hard time holding a fence back at the container, which
is used by the crowd management.92
with explosives had happened. Others claimed that the fatalities resulted, because some
people had fallen on top of others when unsuccessfully trying to climb the stairs from the
side or the billboard (see Figure ). And again others were blaming the crowd for the
outbreak of a ‘mass panic’ (stampede) or at least some people for improper behavior.
The first hypothesis was obviously not true. But what about the others?
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Table 4 Further relevant events (continued)
Starting 16:53 The emergency vehicle stops in the middle of the crowd. Strong shock waves occur all over
the crowd and push people to the ground between tunnel and staircase.93 Arms are lifted up
and people are screaming. A group of people is aggressively pushing their way towards the
tunnel (see endnote93 between minutes 1:28 and 1:35). Some people are crawling on top of
others to get towards the staircase. A helicopter flies overhead. Someone fixes a rope above
the tunnel to allow people to climb up.93,94
16:54-17:03 Some people get pulled up to the narrow staircase. A ladder is lowered down to the container
at the South end of the ramp, and a woman, who seems to be hurt, is lying down on the
container.95,96
Starting 16:57 People are pulled up one by one via the container.97 People in the crowd are being pushed
around. A few people climb onto other people, trying to get out of the crowd. A woman is
screaming loudly.98
Starting 16:58 The situation is extremely crowded. Some people scramble up the narrow staircase. Many
people yell for help.99
Starting 16:59 More people are pulled up from the crowded container to the festival area above. Security
guards and police walk along the East side. A police officer is filming.100 An ambulance car is
approaching on the freeway in the West.
Starting 17:01 View of emergency forces near the staircase area.101
Starting 17:02 People scramble up the stairs. Many people are yelling for help. The situation is extremely
crowded. Police attempt to control the crowd.102
17:02 First victims are reported on the ramp.6,19
Starting 17:03 The stairs are clearing slightly, and some people are able to get up.103
Starting 17:03 A man is trying to grab people and pull them up on the South over the container. Police holds
the fence back. An orange ladder is used to get people out from the container.104
Around 17:04 Seven policemen are talking to a few people. Two are helping someone on the ground.105
Starting 17:05 A view from the tunnel shows some people climbing up over the container, also with the help
of ropes. It seems that people in the tunnel behind are still reasonably fine. Some of them
appear to be dancing.106
Starting 17:05 More people are able to get up via the staircase. The density in the ramp area is reduced, and
the police are turning around some people at the back of the crowd, who are still trying to get
to the stairs.107
Starting 17:05 A crowd of people has fallen in front of the stairs, raising their arms up. Some rescue workers
and festival attendees are pulling people out. One policeman tries to hold back the crowd. An
emergency vehicle is guided to the ramp area by the police, coming from the East tunnel.108
Starting 17:07 The stairs are still crowded. Someone is shouting for help by the police. Some policemen on
the stairs help people up.109
Starting 17:08 Someone is yelling at the police.110 People are pulled out of the fallen crowd, and some
receive first aid. The crowd below the staircase seems ‘cleared’ by the end of the video, and
there is a considerable amount of police and rescue forces.111
Starting 17:08 People can be seen lying on top of each other. The situation is still crowded, but the density
eventually reduces.112
Starting 17:09 The situation continues to be crowded, but people are starting to move more smoothly up
the stairs. The area around the fallen people empties.113
17:15 The operation room of the city of Duisburg does not seem to be aware of the critical situation.
It still calls the Love Parade a big success.114
Starting 17:16 The situation on the ramp has cleared up, but the group of fallen people still seems to be
without professional help. A rescue crew appears in the South-West corner. A person is lying
unconsciously on the ground. Many people try to resuscitate others. Fallen visitors are pulled
out of the pile of people.115
Around 17:20 The crowd has mostly dissolved. Fire and ambulance cars are parked in the South of the ramp.
A woman tries to provide first aid to a man in the South-West corner. At least 2 other people
provide first aid to people on the ground.116
Around 18:00 It is decided not to terminate the Love Parade to avoid further critical situations (by evacuating
the festival area too quickly).6,19,117
3.1 Did the crowd panic?
When talking about crowd disasters, public media often use the term ‘mass panic’, which
suggests the occurrence of a stampede as reason of the disaster (see endnote and also
the name of the link in endnote). This suggests that crowd disasters happen, because
the crowd ‘goes mad’ []. There certainly exist some instances of this kind (such as the
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stampede inBaghdad onAugust , , due to spreading rumors of an imminent suicide
bombing in the crowd, or the stampede in a Chicago night club triggered by rumors of
a poisonous gas attack). However, the hypothesis of a ‘psychological state of panic’ as
reason of crowd disasters has been questioned many times [, ].
What evidence do we have for the Love Parade disaster in Duisburg? Has the crowd
‘gone mad’ because of influence of alcohol and drugs or because of impatience to get on
the festival area? At first sight, one may think so, given that a number of visitors climbed
over fences, up the pole, and on the container to reach the festival area. However, as we
will see, these activities started at a time when people on the ramp were already exposed
to crowded conditions.
Let us discuss this in more detail. The first problems with visitors overcoming fences
were reported around :. However, there were reports as early as : (see Table ),
which show that people waiting for access had difficulties to breathe and asked to open the
emergency exits (which did not happen). These problems demonstrate that the access
capacity was far below demand.
Problems related to queues of people aggravate when queues are long and broad, so
that little or no progress is visible. In such situations, people will subconsciously reduce
their distance eventually. Although the reduction of distance might be negligible, the so-
called ‘queuing effect’ will create the impression of progress. However, it will also cause a
compression of the crowd []. When the distance is small, there will be inadvertent body
contacts, which can add up and cause unintentional pushing. Note that the transition from
an acceptable situation with rare body contacts to a stressful situation with frequent con-
tacts can happen quite abruptly, i.e. the people in the crowd, security forces and police
might not expect this sudden transition []. People may interpret the situation as inten-
tional pushing, which may trigger stress and aggression. At a certain density, it may also
be required to push others away in order to be able to breathe [].
If people have to wait long and are not informed about the reasons for this, they will
become impatient and may eventually start to push intentionally (because they assume
that progress can be accelerated). While most impatient pushing happens in the middle
of the queue, the situation usually becomes most critical at the front of the queue (but the
people who push cannot see this, and they experience much less crowded conditions).
The situation is particularly bad behind bottlenecks. These can create ‘traps’ without any
possibility to escape. Such situations must generally be avoided. This also means that flow
control is not a solution for every problem. It requires suitable designs and an adaptive
operation.
According to our assessment, it had to be expected that the access points would have
to be opened and fences would eventually be overcome, given that the festival area and
the inflow capacity were small (in particular as the access was delayed by leveling works).
Waiting times often amounted to several hours, and access to entertainment, food, water,
and toilets must have been quite limited outside the festival area.
Nevertheless, the problems on the ramp were even more serious than at the access
points. They were related to the low inflow to the festival area (see Table ). An analysis of
surveillance videos suggests that the floats (i.e. the moving music trucks) ‘pulled’ visitors
alongwith them, as expected by the planners, but this was not apparently effective enough.
After the crowd disaster, it was sometimes claimed that the floats even obstructed the in-
flow of arriving visitors. While the inflow never stopped completely before the cordons
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were established, the queue forming at the top of the ramp varied considerably over
time.,, The inflow was particularly low, when a float was slowed down or stopped
around : in the neighborhood of the ramp.
While the organizers considered the possibility of inflow problems,, they assumed
that these could be handled by ‘pushers’ at the upper end of the ramp and that the floats
could be used as well to reduce them (by attracting the crowd onto the festival area and
moving it along with them). However, there was apparently a lack of a sufficient number
of pushers, and the floats did not manage to overcome the inflow problem. It looks like
the floats were slowed down by the dense crowd, which in turn obstructed the inflow
of visitors, thereby creating an unfavorable feedback loop. The situation was particularly
tense from : to : and from : to :; as a consequence, the crowd manager
asked for support by the police at : (or before). The responsible officer arrived around
:, when a jam had formed on the upper part of the ramp. About  minutes later,
a joint strategy was found. However, already at : (i.e. at the time when one of the floats
slowed down in front of the ramp), the situation had deteriorated so much that a large
amount of visitors decided to overcome fences along the ramp to reach the festival area
via the grassy slopes on both sides (see Figure ).,, This mitigated the bottleneck
situation at the end of the ramp, which could have caused serious problems at a much
earlier time. In fact, it seems that the dangerous phenomenon of crowd turbulence (see
Sec. .) first occurred in the upper part of the ramp.
According to Table , the first visitors used the narrow staircase at :, and around
: the first people climbed the pole on the East side of the lower ramp area, to get up
to the festival area. The first people climbed the container of the crowdmanagement on
the South of the ramp at :. This was the time, when the third police cordon is given
up.While the initial flow on the staircase was stopped by police, people used the staircase
again around :. At about the same time, a person climbed a traffic sign on the ramp
(see Figure ). All of thismight have been interpreted by the security as signs of an excited
crowd that did not behave properly, but the temporal coincidence of these events clearly
shows that people were trying to escape from the crowd in any possible way, because they
felt in danger. In fact, behavior of the crowd that might have been perceived as ‘improper’
occurred mainly, after the first two cordons had to be given up (around : and :),
while the third one was still closed, which caused an increasingly crowded situation on
the ramp.
In videos recorded at the Love Parade, the phenomenon of crowd turbulence starts to
appear between : and :. Around the same time one can hear painful shouts,
and some people scream for their lives and for help (see Table ). In this situation, at
least some people must have experienced a psychological state of panic. Nevertheless,
there were no signs of sudden systematic movements of the crowd into a certain direction,
which would indicate a stampede, and no people ‘crawled’ on top of others, yet. Around
:, the forces in the crowd were so critical that a traffic sign was bent, and an uncon-
scious women was passed on to the narrow staircase. Around :, several people tried
to elevate themselves out of the crowd by climbing a billboard next to the traffic sign.
Approximately at the same time, many people between the billboard and the staircase
raised their arms into the air (the movie should be watched in full screen mode to see this
well). This is usually a sign that they have fallen to the ground and are seeking help from
others to get back on their feet. We believe that this was the first sign that people were
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dying or likely to die. At :, an emergency vehicle entered the ramp, but it was taking
care of other problems. Still, there were no sudden moves into one direction visible in
the crowd that would speak for a stampede. Rather, people next to those screaming for
their lives were trying to calm them down by saying ‘you will make it,’ and offering them
water. Around :, a group of people was pushing their way through the crowd to-
wards the tunnel in the West (in the video in endnote this can be seen between :
and : in full screen mode; the same shows up in this video). Around the same time,
some people were trying to ‘crawl’ over others, hoping to escape the situation., While
this was clearly a relentless and potentially harmful behavior, it is not obvious that it killed
others, and it occurred under circumstances that were absolutely life-threatening (which
should not be misunderstood as a justification of such relentless behavior). First deaths
were reported at :.,
3.2 Were people killed by others falling on them from above?
As most people died between the staircase and the billboard, the public media initially
assumed that they were victims of others, who had fallen down after unsuccessfully trying
to climb the staircase from the side or to climb the billboard. Therewas even a statement
that the staircase should have been ‘blasted away’ before the event. However, the videos
viewed by us do not provide convincing evidence that falling people were the cause of the
disaster. It is also not plausible that a few people falling from the staircase could account
for  fatalities and more than  injured people. Moreover, the height of falling was
not large, and most victims were not lying on the side of the staircase, but rather between
the staircase and the entrance of the tunnel (see ‘accident area’ in Figure ).
Nevertheless, the analysis of the videomaterials and photographswitnesses at least three
events of falling people. According to endnote, the first one happened around : at
the billboard, the second shortly later at the same place. The third incident happened at
the same location at :. Furthermore, one person failed to climb the staircase from the
side; around : it fell back to the ground from a low elevation. Apparently, the height
of falling was relatively small, and the falling people also did not trigger a stampede of the
crowd. Therefore, according to our judgment, it is unlikely that people died as a direct
consequence of others falling down from the staircase or billboard.
3.3 Did the staircase cause a crowd crush?
Nevertheless, it is a valid question, whether it was a mistake to let people use the staircase.
It is likely that people were turning towards the staircase, hoping that it would provide
a chance to escape, and that even a minor movement could seriously increase the local
pressure in the crowd, given the high density that had already built up on the ramp. In
fact, the situation in the crowd was highly problematic not only next to the staircase,
but also next to the pole, and it was apparently the use of the pole that inspired the use
of the staircase. Nevertheless, the movement of the crowd towards these improvised
‘emergency exits’ was not large. The videos we have seen do not show the sudden start
waves, which are typical when a waiting crowd (or jammed traffic) starts moving [, ].
Therefore, we doubt that the fatalities were caused just by a relentlessly forward pushing
crowd, which crushed the people. Crushing due to extreme densities rather happens when
a large crowd moves too quickly towards a narrowing []. In Duisburg, however, the
crowd disaster happened in a crowd that barely moved forward. Even though the situation
Helbing and Mukerji EPJ Data Science 2012, 1:7 Page 14 of 40
http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/1/1/7
on the ramp was critical for the crowd from : on, it seems that most people had a
chance to breathe (at least intermittently) and to recover between stressful periods. In fact,
the recordings change many times between screams of panic and more positive noises.
We do not question that the density in the crowd became so high at some locations
that it could seriously harm health and lives, but it is puzzling that most victims were not
found on the side of the staircase, or next to the pole(s) and the container, where they
had to be expected in case of a crowd crush. We also do not deny that the staircase was
an attraction point, but we doubt that it can be seen as immediate cause of the disaster.
It may have even played a significant role for the evacuation of the overcrowded ramp,
since it served as emergency exit. However, this emergency exit was used too late and not
very efficiently. A continuous flow of people on the staircase was established only around
:., Before, it stopped or was blocked many times. The same happened during the
most critical period, when many people tried to climb the staircase from the side, which
considerably obstructed the flow on it.
3.4 Occurrence of crowd turbulence
So far, the cause of the crowd disaster in Duisburg has still not been revealed. If the crowd
did not panic, and people did not die from others falling on them, and a rush towards
the narrow staircase did not cause the crowd disaster, what then was the reason for it?
The answer lies in the dynamics of the crowd, which unintentionally emerged, when the
density became too high. John Fruin describes the situation as follows []: ‘At occupancies
of about  persons per square meter the crowd becomes almost a fluid mass. Shock waves
can be propagated through the mass, sufficient to. . . propel them distances of  meters or
more. . . . Peoplemay be literally lifted out of their shoes, and have clothing torn off. Intense
crowd pressures, exacerbated by anxiety, make it difficult to breathe, which may finally
cause compressive asphyxia. The heat and the thermal insulation of surrounding bodies
cause some to be weakened and faint. Access to those who fall is impossible. Removal of
those in distress can only be accomplished by lifting them up and passing them overhead
to the exterior of the crowd.’
In fact, suffocation was diagnosed as the reason for the death of people during the Love
Parade disaster. In simple words, this means that the lungs of the victims have been
compressed so much that they were unable to breathe enough to get the required amount
of oxygen to survive. Compressive asphyxia was also identified as cause of death in many
other crowd disasters.
According to recent studies [], it is often not the density alone that kills (‘crushes’) peo-
ple, but the particular kind of dynamics that suddenly occurs when the density becomes so
high that physical interaction between people inadvertently transfer forces from one body
to others. Under such conditions, forces in the crowd can add up. Force chains may form,
such that the directions and strengths of the forces acting on the body of an individual in
the crowd are largely varying and hard to predict. As a consequence, an uncontrollable
kind of collective dynamics occurs in the crowd, which is called ‘crowd turbulence’ or
‘crowd quake’ [, ]. The forces in this dynamical state of the crowd can cause various
injuries (in particular of the chest, as in crowd crushes). They are so high that they cannot
even be controlled by large numbers of police forces. Individuals can handle the situation
even less. They are exposed to a large risk of losing balance and stumbling.
Once people have fallen, they constitute obstacles to others and are endangered by oth-
ers falling on top of them, since these can also not control their steps anymore as they
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Figure 2 Computer simulation of a densely crowded area with the heuristic pedestrian model of Ref.
[27] (figure from the Supporting Information). Orange and red areas indicate the locations with the
highest crowd pressure, when a densely packed crowd tries to move around the corner. The simulated
situation is analogous to leaving visitor streams at the Love Parade in Duisburg, trying to leave the main ramp
through the tunnel in the West. Note, however, that the above simulation does not consider inflows of visitors
arriving from the East. These would move the high-pressure area a bit up the ramp, where the accident
actually happened.
wish. Hence, the surrounding people are likely to stumble as well, which creates a ‘domino
effect’. The resulting number of falling people may be large. This creates a heap of peo-
ple, in which nobody can easily get back on their feet again. Those on the bottom have
serious difficulties to breathe, and they are likely to suffocate if this state lasts too long,
given the weight of others on their top.
Directly after the Love Parade disaster, when the situation was far from clear, one of the
authors conjectured that ‘crowd turbulence’ was the likely cause of the fatalities. Eye
witness reports and the analysis of video recordings confirms this hypothesis. Crowd
turbulence can be observed in the crowd at least from about : on around the pole
and from : on in the lower part of the ramp. Before :, a considerable number
of people fell to the ground between the tunnel and the staircase, approximately at lo-
cations where computer simulations predict the largest crowd pressures (see Figure ).
The situation deteriorated further around :, when crowd turbulence affected almost
the entire width of the ramp, i.e. hundreds or even thousands of people were irregularly
moved around by the pressure in the crowd;many of them stumbled and fell on top of each
other. The troubled area agrees with the one, where most victims were found., Un-
der the weight of others lying on them, they must have eventually suffocated, since there
were not enough emergency forces to help them back on their feet in time.
Public blogs have been wondering about the reasons for the layered crowd of fallen peo-
ple:
• Did the emergency vehicle driving on the densely crowded ramp trigger the falling?
• Was there a fence lying on the ramp, that should have covered a broken manhole
cover?
While cars moving through a dense crowd can indeed trigger critical conditions, it seems
that people had already fallen to the ground (around :), before the emergency vehicle
arrived on the ramp (around :).,,
A broken manhole cover or any kind of obstacle lying on the ground would certainly
have made it difficult for people to keep their balance and stay on their feet, when pushed
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around by turbulent waves. Such obstacles are dangerous and should certainly not have
been located in the bottleneck area (the ramp). While, even without obstacles, it is likely
that crowd turbulence would have caused people to fall sooner or later, obstacles can act
as ‘nucleation points’ and thereby possibly trigger an earlier falling of people, which may
reduce their chances of survival.
4 Causal interdependencies
We must now discuss the question, how the conditions, which caused the deadly crowd
turbulence, have come about.
4.1 Failure of flow control
When viewing the area of the Love Parade in Duisburg (see Figure ), the choice of loca-
tion appears surprising, since the festival area was relatively small and furthermore con-
strained by railway tracks on one side (in the East) and by a freeway on the other side (in
the West). This becomes particularly clear when comparing the area with the one used
during the Love Parades in Berlin. As this circumstance implied a risk and the bottle-
neck at the ramp during peak hours was foreseeable (see Sec. .), flow control was crucial
for the safety of the Love Parade. However, there was a whole avalanche of problems that
accumulated and, thereby, caused the crowd disaster.
The first problem on the day of the Love Parade occurred when the opening of the fes-
tival had to be delayed by approximately one hour due to a delay in the completion of the
leveling work (see Table ). Therefore, many visitors must have been queued up already
at the time when the festival area was opened. It seems that the organization of the mass
event could never make up for this delay.
The overall inflow capacity was apparently further reduced through obstructions by the
floats, which had probably not been anticipated to that extent (see Sec. .). As a conse-
quence of this, access control was necessary already at : (see Table ), much before
the expected peak hours. This further increased the queues and the waiting times. The
following quote witnesses the problems: ‘We parked the car about  kilometers away
from the freight station (next to the festival area), and it took us almost  hours (!) to get to
the Love Parade (festival area). On the way, we were facing blocked roads time and again,
fences were carried over us, emergency forces could not get through, people collapsed,. . . ’.
Clearly, visitors of the event must have become impatient, particularly because there
was probably a lack of food, drinks and toilets outside of the festival area (since such long
waiting times were not anticipated). One could, therefore, expect that it would be difficult
to control the inflow. In this connection, it is also worth noting that there was not much
entertainment outside the festival area to shorten the psychological waiting time and to
relieve stress and impatience. Apparently, there was a stage outside the festival area, which
was supposed to absorb some of the visitors, who could not get to the festival area, but
for some obscure reason, it was moved to another area, where it attracted only a smaller
number of people.
Between : and :, the organizers found it difficult to control the inflow with the
isolating devices (see Table ). This was probably not just a result of the excessive waiting
times, which caused impatience, but possibly also because some of their security people
were needed elsewhere (e.g. to improve the outflow from the ramp or to guide VIPs). As
a consequence, the organizers tried to get support by the police.
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For a number of reasons, it seems to have taken a considerable amount of time to get
the requested police support. Communication by walkie talkies and mobile phones did
not work reliably. There were also no functioning loud speakers at the ramp, as there
should have been. Moreover, there was a change of police shifts between : and :,
when the situation started to deteriorate. Various reports suggest that police and orga-
nizers were not well coordinated, probably due to the afore-mentioned communication
problems. It is also likely that the following emergency operations had not been exercised
before. As a consequence, the police may have tried to solve the problem with concepts
they were familiar with. They formed several police cordons for flow control. This tactic is
often applied to get control of violent crowds. However, it failed during the Love Parade,
and we will now analyze why.
4.2 A lack of overview of everybody
As was pointed out in Sec. ., when the crowd was trapped in a situation of extreme
density, it did not have a chance to get an overview of the situation and possible ways
to improve it, in particular to get out of the area. Signs and loudspeaker announcements
were not available. The only possible emergency exits they could recognize were the nar-
row staircase, the pole(s), and the container of the crowd management. They were used
accordingly, which was quite reasonable in the more and more dangerous situation that
the crowd found itself in.
At this time, all the hope to get control of the situation rested on the police. The police
may have been surprised by the sudden need to take control, which was requested by the
crowd manager when difficulties to access the festival area occurred at the upper end of
the ramp. The police tried to solve the problem by establishing cordons, but it was soon
noticed that police cordons a, , and  (see Figure ) blocked not only the inflow, but the
outflow as well. This is also the reason why cordon a was moved behind the side ramp
(see cordon b in Figure ), and why police cordon  was formed at the upper end of the
ramp (after dissolving cordon ). This would have allowed to re-direct the outflow via the
side ramp. However, before these operations could be completed, cordons b and  had to
be given up because of the increasing pressure in the waiting crowd, while cordon  was
still there.
It is known that dense counter-flows are unstable andmay give rise tomutual blockages,
which can cause crowd disasters [, ]. For such reasons, it is recommended to separate
the flow directions at mass events. Yet, it was not the instability of dense counter-flows
which caused the incident in Duisburg. The lack of directional flow separation, however,
did not allow one to clear the ramp, after it became crowded by the dissolution of two of
the cordons.When cordons b and  had to be given up, the police suddenly found itself in
a situation, where in- and outflows blocked each other, and it was basically impossible to
evacuate the ramp in conventional ways, when people quickly accumulated on both sides
of cordon . A trap without exits or emergency exits resulted, from which people could
not get out, and the situation kept getting worse.
For people in the crowd, it was impossible to gain a sufficient overview of the situa-
tion and to find a solution. Police had helicopter surveillance and was filming the ramp
from the top. However, it took some time until the criticality of the situation was noticed
and evacuation measures were taken. When the evacuation finally became effective, the
ramp cleared quickly. But prompt action was delayed by communication problems. It
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Table 5 Course of events as presented in the police report6
14:27-15:05,
15:55-17:00
Queues of arriving visitors form at the upper end of the main ramp, which leads to the festival
area. For this case it was planned (1) to use ‘pushers’ in order to make the people move
forward, (2) to close the access points in the East and West in front of the tunnels, (3) to make
loudspeaker announcements [pp.20+13].
15:16 The crowd manager asks for police support via the liaison officer [p.31].
Around 15:30 The relevant police officer arrives at the container of the crowd manager [p.31].
15:30-15:40 Crowd manager and this police officer jointly decide (1) to ask crowd management/security
staff to work as ‘pushers’ in order to ensure a better inflow into the festival area from the upper
end of the ramp, (2) to close the access points for approximately 10 minutes, (3) to form a
cordon in the middle of the ramp in order to shield visitors trying to enter the festival area
from behind [pp.20+31].
15:45 In the discussion with other police officers, this plan is modified towards forming 2 police
cordons in the tunnels to the West and to the East [p.22].
15:50-16:20 Police cordon 1 is formed in the tunnel in the West (first before the side ramp and then after it
from 16:02 on in order to allow people to use the side ramp) [p.21].
15:57-16:16 Police cordon 2 is formed in the tunnel in the East [p.21].
16:01-16:24 A third police cordon is formed in the middle of the ramp in order to avoid that visitor flows
returning from the Love Parade would undermine police cordons 1 and 2 from behind
[p.21+22].
Around 16:10 When arriving at the relevant area of the ramp, the responsible officer discovers that (1) many
people are trying to leave the festival area and (2) the expected dissolution of the jam at the
upper end of the ramp did not happen within the 10 minute time period foreseen for this.
Therefore, the blockage of the inflows by cordons 1 and 2 must be maintained longer than
planned. Due to this delay and since the access points must be intermittently opened, the
pressure on police cordons 1 and 2 becomes so high that they must be given up [p.23].
16:24 Visitors are jammed up on both sides of police cordon 3. The situation becomes extremely
crowded [p.24]. Therefore, police cordon 3 is dissolved, also because it is ‘ineffective’ between
two oppositely directed flows [pp.24+34].
16:31 A new (transparent) police cordon is formed at the upper end of the ramp from 16:31 on
[pp.21+24]. It serves to stop the outflow of leaving visitors via the main ramp and to encourage
arriving visitors to use the slopes to enter the festival area (see Figure 1).5,156 [pp.24+34]
16:39 The fire brigade reports ‘panic-like’ movements on the ramp with some over-run people [p.25].
16:40-16:55 The festival area is closed for newly arriving visitors (by moving vehicles in front of the access
points) [pp.25+35].
After
evacuation of
ramp area
Some densely crowded spots remain around the container, two poles and the narrow
staircase. It is not possible to redirect them by words or gestures [pp.34+35]
The numbers in square brackets correspond to the page numbers of the report.
seems that the first loudspeaker announcement could only be made around :, after a
loudspeaker vehicle had entered the ramp.
Why did the evacuation start so late? The analysis of the police is presented in Table .
It seems that first attempts to direct the crowd towards the upper end of the ramp started
around :,, but were not very effective. It is true that evacuation attempts take
some time, but there was also a lack of efficient means of communication (such as loud-
speakers or megaphones). Moreover, we would like to point out the following: In crisis
situations, decision-makers are often overwhelmed by the pace of events [], mainly for
two reasons: First, it takes time to collect information locally, and bring it to the attention
of the chief police officer, who then takes a decision and gives commands. These are then
transmitted down to the local police forces through the command chain. Second, criti-
cal situations are often characterized by incomplete, contradictory, and ambiguous infor-
mation, which makes it difficult to assess the situation correctly and come to the right
conclusions.
When the situation on the ramp became unbearable and life-threatening, people started
to escape via the pole, the container and the staircase next to the ramp. This could have
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beenmisinterpreted as aggressive attempts of impatient visitors to storm the festival area,
but in reality, it was a sign of emergency. However, due to the noise level, screams for
help, were hard to comprehend. Also visitors (on the East), looking on the ramp from
above around : did not have a sense of emergency. This makes it understandable,
why pressure relief operations were not yet effective, when the crowd disaster was about
to start.
Once the evacuation process on the ramp started, the area emptied quickly., The
narrow staircase also might have played an important role as an emergency exit at this
time. Others managed to leave the ramp towards the festival area, following the emer-
gency vehicle. However, people close to the staircase were still focused on it. This
might have been a result of the ‘tunnel vision’ that develops when people are stressed.
Even when the surrounding crowd had dissolved, it took a long time, until those who had
fallen to the ground between the tunnel in the West and the staircase got back on their
feet, if they managed this at all., In fact, many of them were injured or died.
A lack of overview is typical for crises situations. During the Love Parade disaster in
Duisburg this is, for example, reflected by the fact that, around :, the minister of in-
terior visited the Love Parade (see Table ), but despite first signs of overcrowding, he left
the festival area before the incident. At :, the organizer gave an interview, which still
called the event a success, and as late as :, the city’s situation room made a similar
statement. Emergency forces were also responding late. As a consequence, a triage pro-
cedure had to be applied. (This procedure is typical for war zones, major disasters, and
terrorist attacks.) Therefore, many people in critical health conditions did not get first
aid.
5 Discussion
In the following, we try to gain an integrative view of causal factors of the crowd disaster,
which strictly needs to be distinguished from a legal analysis or a determination of respon-
sibilities. We also want to stress that the main purpose of our analysis is to learn for the
future, i.e. to identify factors that need to be paid more attention to.
5.1 Resilience, systemic instabilities, and cascading effects
Note that, generally, a good organizational concept should be resilient (‘forgiving’), i.e. it
should be robust to mistakes and complications. Therefore, many disasters do not have a
single causing factor. They are a result of interaction effects. This also applies to the Love
Parade disaster which, as we will argue below, can be understood as result of a systemic
instability. The term ‘systemic instability’ is used here for situations, where small per-
turbations can trigger a series of events through mutual amplification effects in a way that
things eventually get out of control, even if everyone makes best efforts. At the Love Pa-
rade, people were dying although nobody wanted this and everyone was trying to prevent
the death of people. Other examples for systemic instabilities are
- spontaneous breakdowns of traffic flows above a certain critical density (even when
everyone is driving in a circle and trying hard to maintain a finite speed) [, ],
- breakdowns of cooperation in social dilemma situations, which give rise to ‘tragedies
of the commons’ [],
- political revolutions [–] and
- financial breakdowns.,
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Many systemic instabilities come along with cascading effects, which tend to create ex-
treme events [, ]: the overload of one component of the system challenges other com-
ponents, which therefore causes a propagation of problems through the system. Usually,
cascading effects do not occur during normal operation, but are triggered by (random)
perturbations or the coincidence of several complicating factors. They tend to occur when
the interdependencies in the system exceed a critical strength. For example, cascading ef-
fects are observed in traffic jam formation (when the density is too high) [], blackouts
of power grids, for many kinds of disasters [], for the current financial crisis, and for
the Arab Spring revolutions [–].
5.2 What caused the crowd disaster: causal interdependencies of contributing
factors
The following analysis discusses cascading effects that have (most likely) contributed to
the Love Parade disaster in Duisburg (see Figure  for an illustration).
- Berlin rejects to host the Love Parade (LP), and other cities take over. The Love
Parade moves from city to city, which creates new organizational challenges each time
(in more difficult locations than in Berlin with its wide roads and expansion areas).
The change of organizational teams makes it difficult to accumulate crowd
management experience over many events.
- Bochum has to cancel its Love Parade, because it cannot manage the security
challenges.
- Duisburg/Essen is elected as cultural metropole . It is under pressure to come
up with an attractive cultural program. This seems to have created a desire to approve
the Love Parade.,
- The festival area does not provide capacity reserves and implies a number of
organizational difficulties. In the tunnel and on the ramp, in- and outflows are not
separated, and there is no separate route for emergency vehicles (i.e. they have to use
the tunnel as well).
- To overcome security concerns, an evacuation study is commissioned. It mainly
focuses on evacuation scenarios, assuming a maximum concurrent number of
visitors as it was required by the security concept of the city.,
- Due to the late approval of the event (see Table ), the security concept may have been
finished ‘last minute’ (and vice versa). The likely consequence is that contingency
plans may have been insufficient and could not be exercised enough. There was
probably also not enough time to ensure a good coordination between organizers and
police forces.
- Due to delays in finishing the leveling work (see Table ), the festival area of the Love
Parade is opened later than expected. This implies an early overload of the access
points and causes an impatient crowd (particularly as facilities, supply and
entertainment were probably scarce outside the festival area).
- People enter the Love Parade area later and return earlier than expected.
- The interaction of the floats with the crowd does not enable a sufficient inflow to the
festival area. This apparently requires that crowd management forces are moved away
from the isolating devices to the end of the ramp, in order to improve the inflow;
requested VIP support seems to absorb some manpower as well.
- The crowd management faces problems to control the isolation devices, and it tries to
organize police support.
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Figure 3 Illustration of causal interdependencies between different factors that have most likely
contributed to the emergence of the crowd disaster during the Love Parade in Duisburg. One can see
that the reason for the crowd disaster was not a single factor, but amplifying feedback and cascading effects,
as it is typical for systemic instabilities. Therefore, most contributing factors are consequences of other factors.
Also note that causal dependencies have to be clearly distinguished from legal responsibilities. (Question
marks indicate likely contributing factors, which we have not proven by us in a strict sense, but are plausible
conclusions that are not questioned by any counter-evidence known to us.)
- There are difficulties in the communication and coordination between organizers and
police. Suitable communication means are missing or not used or are not working in a
reliable way. Therefore, the feedback between the situation, the crowd management,
and the crowd is insufficient.
- Due to communication problems and a change in police shifts, police support may
have been delayed. Moreover, it must have been difficult for the new shift to get an
overview of the situation.
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- Maybe due to the urgency of the situation, it is decided to form two police cordons in
the tunnels leading to the ramp. A third police cordon is established in the middle of
the ramp, where fences narrow down the diameter of the ramp. It shall prevent that
leaving visitors undermine the police cordons in the tunnel from behind.
- The police cordons in the tunnel are given up, probably because of the high pressure
of the arriving crowd. This replaces the problem at the upper end of the ramp by an
even bigger problem in the middle of it: A lot of visitors are moving into the lower
ramp area through the tunnel, while many others are waiting at the upper end to leave
the event. As the third cordon blocks in- and outflows, jams of arriving and leaving
visitors are quickly growing on both sides of cordon . The cordon is dissolved,
because it is ineffective, and a new police cordon is formed at the upper end of the
ramp.
- At this time, the situation in the crowd is already critical. The lack of separation of
opposite flow directions makes it difficult to let people out without letting people
in. Therefore, it is impossible to evacuate the ramp efficiently.
- People on the ramp try to escape the life-threatening situation over the staircases, the
pole(s), and the container (see Sec. .). This may have been misinterpreted as a ‘mob’
trying to force its way into the festival area, which needs to be controlled. Pressure
relief efforts become effective only very late.
- In absence of separate emergency routes, fences and cordons must be opened to allow
an emergency vehicle to pass (see Table ). This creates openings for a further inflow
of people.
- The overcrowded situation causes dangerous ‘crowd turbulence’ (see Sec. .). Many
people are falling and pile up on top of each other. Emergency forces cannot reach
people quickly enough.  of them die of suffocation, and more than  are
injured.,
- As an unexpectedly large number of people need help, there are not enough
emergency forces at the location of the accident. Therefore, a triage procedure is
applied in the tunnel. As a consequence, many people in critical health conditions
do not receive first aid.
5.3 What might have stopped the feedback and cascading effects
Overall, one gets the impression that problems occurred on all sides (but we admit that
it is easier to identify them afterwards than at the time when decisions must be taken
on the basis of often limited and imperfect information). The above analysis shows that
things went wrong from the very beginning, and that the situation increasingly got out of
control over time. However, we believe that there were also many possibilities to mitigate
or overcome problems that contributed to the disaster. Therefore, we will now discuss,
how the deadly cascading effect described in the previous subsection might have been
stopped or how its size and impact could have been reduced:
- One might have been able to find a better suited area for the organization of the event.
- One could have required higher organizational standards (such as a separation of flow
directions).
- The decision to hold the event or not could have been taken earlier. This would have
facilitated a better preparation and a better coordination. It would also have reduced
the commercial and public pressure in case of deciding against the event.
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- Safety and security concerns could have been taken more seriously. The fact that the
responsible police officer quit his job could have been seen as advance warning sign.
- Superior contingency plans could have been elaborated, in order to be better prepared
for the occurrence of various problems. This applies particularly to the handling of the
main bottlenecks of the system: the ramp and the access points.
- If the evacuation study had raised serious concerns, this might have been able to stop
the approval of the event.
- The various stakeholders could have foreseen larger safety margins and more reserves
(also in terms of staff).
- It might have been possible to work out a different flow concept, which separates in-
and outflows. A circulatory flow organization (where people would come in via the
tunnels and both ramps, but leave over the closed-down freeway) would have been
interesting to consider.
- Obstacles on the ramp (such as the food stand, fences in the way, and police cars)
could have been avoided.
- Efforts could have been made to ensure better communication between the different
stakeholders (by reserving [more] priority lines in the mobile phone network) and
better communication between the organizers and the crowd (by installing
loudspeakers at the ramp and elsewhere). A loudspeaker vehicle could have been
moved to the ramp, when it was noticed that no loudspeaker equipment was available
on the ramp (around :, see Table ), or megaphones could have been used to
communicate with the crowd.
- When it became clear that people had difficulties to enter the festival area and jams
formed on the ramp, one might have been able to move the floats further away from
the ramp. Moreover, the side ramp could have been used to avoid the jam on the main
ramp.
- The use of more ‘pushers’ might have been able to increase the outflow from the ramp
to the festival area (but it is not clear how effective this measure would have been,
given that the entrance area to the festival ground was quite packed).
- More emergency forces (rescue units) could have been positioned on the ramp and
next to it.
- When it was recognized that the crowd management and control did not work as
expected, the first police shift might have been extended.
- When the situation became crowded, cordons could have been established at the
isolation devices and at the end of the main ramp. The outflow of people could have
been redirected (either via the side ramp or via the emergency exits).
- With loudspeakers or megaphones, people on the overcrowded ramp could have been
evacuated earlier and in a more effective way, e.g. by organizing an outflow from the
ramp to the festival area behind the chain of police cars that were standing on the
ramp (see Figure ). Additionally, a continuous evacuation via the staircase could have
been established from : on (or even from : on, when people needed to use the
slopes to get on the festival area). Furthermore, the tunnels could have been used to
evacuate the ramp, if the flow directions would have been separated.
Given the above alternatives, the crowd disaster might have been avoided in many ways.
Already around : there were first signs that the crowd management concept would
not work as planned (see Table ). Between : and : it was noticed that the ramp
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constituted a bottleneck that could get out of control. Around :, people climbing the
pole, staircase and containerwere seriouswarning signs of a critical situation (see Sec. .).
At this time, it would probably have been possible still to evacuate the ramp, if suitable
communication tools had been used. However, the ramp emptied only after :.
6 Lessons to be learned and recommendations
6.1 Summary
One of the noteworthy points of the Love Parade disaster is that most evidence is available
online, which allows many scientists and also the broader public to form an opinion. This
dramatically changes the situation compared to many previous disasters, where a lot of
evidence is of confidential nature, accessible only to a small number of experts.We believe
that the new openness of data can have many beneficial effects on society. This study, for
example, hopes to make a contribution to a better understanding of crowd disasters and
their avoidance in the future. The accessibility of the materials can also serve organizers
of mass events, the police and emergency forces to prepare themselves better.
Through the analysis of publicly available materials and videos, we could identify many
factors that have contributed to the Love Parade disaster. Our judgement is that the ca-
pacity of the area of the mass event already implied various problems, which the orga-
nizational concept wanted to overcome by crowd control. However, the delayed start of
the event and the unexpected obstruction of the inflow to the festival area from the ramp
(i.e. two factors which were probably not anticipated) caused queues that were difficult
(or impossible) to manage. Already in the organizational phase, but also in the attempt
to manage the flows, many problems came together, and the mutual interaction of these
problems made the situation worse. In particular, the cordons that were intended to dis-
solve the jam at the entrance to the festival area did not yield the expected relief. While
they might have worked in case of unidirectional flows, the situation became worse due
to the fact that a flow of returning visitors encountered an inflow of arriving people with-
out a separation of the flow directions. From the very beginning, the interaction of many
factors resulted in cascading effects, which eventually created a situation that got totally
out of control (see Figure ).
Organizational concepts for mass events are supposed to be robust to the occurrence
of single perturbations (‘single points of failure’). This in itself, however, does not exclude
the possibility that the coincidence or interaction of problems can cause a systemic failure.
When certain factors have amplifying effects on other factors (or there are even feedback
loops), this can create systemic instabilities. We learn from this that, in order to reach a
resilient organization of mass events (and actually any complex system), it is not sufficient
to ensure the robustness of each contributing factor. One must also study their interac-
tion effects, to guarantee that the overall organization is resilient to the coincidence of
unfavorable factors as much as possible.
Our study also sheds new light on issues that have been controversially discussed. Im-
mediately after the Love Parade disaster, the behavior of the crowd and the staircase were
blamed for the fatalities. However, our analysis yields a different interpretation: the Love
Parade incident shows the typical features of crowd disasters, such as the existence of
bottlenecks (and therefore the accumulation of large numbers of people), organizational
problems, communication failures, problematic decisions, coordination problems, and
the occurrence of crowd turbulence as a result of high crowd densities.
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It is likely that the staircase encouraged a movement of the crowd towards it, when peo-
ple were trying to escape from the life-threatening density in the ramp area, but the collec-
tive movement seems to have been small (it is not clearly visible in the video recordings).
In any case, effective measures (such as an evacuation of the crowd) should have been
taken long before critical conditions developed. Given the high density in the ramp area,
the occurrence of crowd turbulence or ‘crowd quakes’ was unavoidable. In this dynamical
state of the crowd, the lives of people are in serious danger, as people will fall sooner or
later. The triggering of this deadly dynamics does not require a particular reason.
Furthermore, note that the pushing in the crowd at high densities is not necessarily a
result of violent behavior, but of the fact that physical forces are transmitted via the bodies
of others and adding up. Under such conditions, it is very difficult to keep control over
the motion of one’s own body, since one is literally moved around by the crowd. The situ-
ation in the crowd is difficult also, because no one has an overview of the scene, and the
noise level (as well as the overload of the mobile phone network) make communication
largely impossible. While the conditions in the crowd were likely to cause a high level of
stress, this was a reasonable response to the life-threatening situation. However, a mass
panic wasmost likely not the cause of the Love Parade disaster. The video recordings from
the Love Parade do not provide evidence for a stampede of people, while the dangerous
phenomenon of crowd turbulence is clearly visible.
Note that crowd disasters during religious pilgrimage in the past recently led to im-
portant insights and also to significant improvements of crowd management and control
[–]. Many of the lessons learned can also be transferred to other mass events in order
to improve their safety. The authors propose to consider the following points (besides the
official regulations, of course):
- Large mass events should preferably take place in locations where experience with the
management of large crowds already exists for a long time. It should at least involve
some experts who have participated in the organization of previous mass events and
know how to handle critical situations. Local organizing teams should be supported
by experienced national or supranational professionals.
- The security concept should be finished, distributed, discussed, and exercised at a
pre-specified date well in advance of the event.
- The event must be planned on the basis of the number of expected people, not on the
basis of capacity.
- An organizational concept that requires keeping many people out or delays them for
hours should be avoided.
- Facilities (e.g. toilets), supply (particularly food and water), as well as entertainment
should be ensured also for people on the way to the festival area and for those waiting
to enter.
- One should implement ways preventing pressure on decisions that may have impact
on the safety and security of people. It should not be possible to ignore qualified
minority opinions. Contradictory voices should be documented and seriously
addressed.
- Consultants should be encouraged to comment on any critical issues (even beyond
the scope of the commissioned analysis).
- An analysis of the expected inflows and outflows (and, hence, number of participants)
needs to be performed, considering the possibility of large flow variations.
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A bottleneck analysis is crucial. It must also take into account moving bottlenecks
such as floats, but also the operation of police or emergency vehicles. Confluence,
turning and intersection points should be determined. In this context, computer
simulations with state-of-the art pedestrian software can be useful, but model
parameters must be carefully chosen. Note that computer simulations can often help
to identify crowded areas, but they are not sufficient to reveal all kinds of
organizational challenges.
- Critical points should be removed, and it must be checked, whether the remaining
problems can be safely handled by crowd management and control measures also
under adverse conditions. Safety margins (such as capacity reserves) should be
foreseen[], and detailed contingency plans should be worked out for likely and
unlikely events, and exercised. (Contingency plans serve to reduce the need of
improvisation and to ensure a quick and effective response to any occurring
problems.) Interaction, cascading and side effects of complicating factors should be
analyzed as well. Remaining areas and factors of concern must be continuously
monitored (e.g. by video surveillance and special software for real-time analytics).
Sufficient security and emergency forces should always be present to remove or at
least mitigate problems early on. Delays in response must be avoided, as they tend to
reinforce problems, i.e. quick action is often key to effective counter-measures []. To
stop possible interaction and cascading effects, suitable decoupling strategies should
be implemented.
- Pressure relief and evacuation strategies must be prepared for any potentially critical
areas. Evacuation measures must be started before an area becomes over-crowded.
- Intersecting flows should be avoided and different flow directions should be separated
(as dense counter-flows are unstable and dangerous [, ]). A ‘circular’ flow
organization, preferably with alternative routes, should be considered. Moreover,
space for emergency vehicles and operations should be reserved.
- Fences are not good everywhere. They may turn into obstacles and create dangerous
situations. Therefore, the use of fences (or cordons) to stop large numbers of people
needs to be carefully considered, as they may be ineffective or deteriorate the
situation. In many cases, it is safer to keep people moving (e.g. by re-routing people)
rather than stopping them.
- Proper signposting must give visitors orientation everywhere about locations of
facilities, ways in and out, and emergency exits.
- Situational awareness and well-functioning communication are crucial. Quick
information feedback about the situation in any relevant place and about any relevant
factor must be ensured. It is important to have an efficient information flow between
the different people and institutions involved (organizers, police, emergency forces,
crowd,. . . ).
- In case of problems, the corresponding contingency plan should be applied, and the
situation should be continuously (re-)assessed to check for the plausibility of the
situational analysis, considering possible alternatives.
- It should be considered to give police and emergency forces more autonomous (local)
decision-making power and responsibility, particularly when communication is
interrupted or quick action is needed.
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- Communication must work (both, from a technical and an organizational
perspective). It is key to detect, avoid, and respond to critical situations.
Communication is also crucial for the capacity to reduce undesirable interaction
effects and to stop dangerous cascading effects.
- Finally, a safety culture must be actively promoted, reminding everyone that problems
can always happen. The motto should be: ‘Don’t take it easy. Always expect the
unexpected!’ Preparations for all sorts of surprising situations (including a sudden
change of the weather) should be made as much as possible.
6.2 Some commonmisconceptions
As discussed before, our study questions a number of common views about crowd disas-
ters. This concerns the following points:
 The word ‘pushing’ suggests that people would relentlessly push forward towards
their goal, not caring at all about others.
 The concept of ‘mass panic’ sees a stampede as the origin of the crowd disaster,
resulting from a contagious mass psychological effect. It also assumes that the
crowd behaves unreasonably.
 The term ‘crushing’ suggests that the cause of the crowd disaster is an uncontrolled
pushing of a crowd towards a bottleneck, which creates densities so high that the
bodies of people are crushed.
 The word ‘trampling’ suggests that people walk carelessly over others.
Such views tend to blame the crowd for the disaster rather than drawing suitable conse-
quences regarding the organization of mass events, the crowd management and commu-
nication. Therefore, recurring disasters may be a consequence of misconceptions about
them. In contrast to the above interpretations, our analysis of the crowd disaster in Duis-
burg suggests the following:
 It is the ‘queuing effect’ which causes a denser and denser queue of people over time
[], and a lot of pushing in the crowd happens unintentionally. This is, because
physical forces start to add up when the density becomes so high that people start to
have body contact. Aggravating factors, which may lead to intentional pushing are
() long waiting times without food, water, facilities, and entertainment, () the
absence of understandable, communicated reasons for the delays, and
() threatening high-density conditions.
 The main danger are the laws of physics, not psychology [, , , ]. People do
normally not die because they panic - they panic when their life is in danger. We do
not deny that people get impatient after long waiting times and that some of them
also disrespect rules in order to get towards their goal (in particular if these rules do
not appear justified to them). However, even under extremely critical conditions,
people helped each other and behaved quite rationally. They overcame barriers,
used slopes, staircases, poles and the container mainly, when this was necessary to
evacuate themselves and reduce the density in the crowd. What might have
appeared as an unreasonable crowd forcing its way into the festival area may be
better interpreted as a crowd trying to find a way out of the dangerous trap it was in.
However, despite a rather rational behavior altogether, some individuals suffered
from ‘tunnel vision’, which is a phenomenon that can occur under conditions of
stress. This becomes evident from the fact that those standing around the poles,
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staircase and container, hoping to get out, were not considering alternative
emergency routes anymore, even when prompted to them by the police.,
 One must distinguish between a ‘mass panic’, a ‘crowd crush’ and a ‘crowd quake’. In a
classical crush, people are moving towards a physical bottleneck and are crushed in
front of its narrowest point due to lack of space. A crowd crush might or might
not result from a stampede that is caused by mass panic (e.g. as consequence of a
bomb threat). In contrast, in a ‘crowd quake’, there is typically no systematic flow
direction, but people are pushed around by fluctuating forces in the crowd. In
Duisburg, people’s lives were endangered not by a stampede that crushed other
people, but by a high crowd pressure (defined as density times variability of body
movements []). An extreme and fluctuating pressure builds up, when the densities
become so high that they cause contact forces between bodies to add up. This
ultimately implies a sudden onset of ‘crowd turbulence’. Under such conditions, the
sizes and directions of forces acting on the bodies of visitors move them around in
an uncontrolled way, and people have difficulties keeping their balance; when people
stumble and fall, this can be the nucleus of a crowd disaster (see next point).
 One must distinguish between (active) trampling and being trampled. When trying to
avoid the deadly ‘domino effect’, people may be forced to step on others. In
Duisburg, only a few people were relentlessly ‘crawling’ or walking over the heads or
shoulders of others. This happened around :, when the ultimate inferno of the
crowd disaster happened and it was likely that (some) people had already died. Note,
however, that many people probably stepped on others who were lying on the
ground. Why did they do such a thing? In a dense and shaky crowd, fallen people
have difficulties to get up on their feet again. This may cause a ‘hole’ in the crowd, so
that the surrounding people are not anymore counter-balanced: they are pushed
from behind, but not anymore from the front. As a consequence, the surrounding
people may fall one after another like dominos, causing a pile of people., If they
cannot get back on their feet quickly, they are likely to pass out or suffocate, since
they cannot breathe anymore under the weight of others piling up on top of them.
Therefore, to avoid falling when pushed around by the crowd, people might be
forced to step on others. However, under these conditions, they are rather ‘walked’
than ‘walking’. That is, while the passive verb ‘being trampled’ is correct, the active
form ‘trampling’ is misleading.
6.3 Conclusion and ‘natural laws’ of crowd behavior
It is obvious that situations such as the ones described above must be absolutely avoided.
This requires the choice of a suitable location and an adequate preparation of the mass
event, an appropriate organization and crowdmanagement, and a quick response to early
warning signs, for which information and communication play a key role. It is also im-
portant to understand that crowd behavior follows certain ‘laws of nature’, which result
from physical, physiological, psychological and social needs of humans such as sufficient
space, food, water, and air, toilet facilities, feeling of safety, perceived progress towards
the goal, information, communication, entertainment, etc. An insufficient consideration
of such factors can promote disasters, particularly if shortcomings accumulate.
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Table 6 This table is intended to help assess the level of criticality of the situation in the
crowd and take proactive measures to avoid or at least mitigate crowd disasters
Observation Assessment Required action
0 Densities are below
2-3 persons per
square meter.
Normal operation at
low risk.
Regularly verify normal operation, watch out for
perturbations. Make sure that the flow does not
exceed the safe value of 82 persons per minute and
meter.
1 People accumulate.
Certain areas become
progressively more
crowded.
People slow down
due to a bottleneck
or stop for some
reason.
Limit inflows to ensure that the expected extent of
accumulation will not be exceeded. Gather
information and determine the reasons for the
accumulation. Prepare possible counter-measures.
Move enough security to the respective area. Inform
the responsible police and emergency units.
2 Jams of people are
forming and growing.
Insufficient outflows
may cause serious
problems over time
(such as high
densities), particularly
in constraint spaces.
Communicate with the crowd. Promptly take
appropriate flow reduction measures such as
re-directing people. (Keep in mind that stopping
people causes a growing pressure in the crowd and
impatience.) Move police and emergency units
towards the crowded area(s) in case help will be
needed.
3 Stop-and-go waves
occur (this happens
only in densemoving
crowds). People are
pushed.
The continuous flow
has broken down.
The outflow capacity
is considerably
reduced. The
situation may
escalate quickly.
Take suitable counter-measures. Pressure relief
strategies (such as opening emergency routes and
re-routing inflows) should be taken and people
informed about them. Before, any obstacles (such as
fences) in the way must be removed. A sufficient
number of emergency units and police must be in
the critical area and ready take over control in
interaction with the crowd management.
4 People cannot move
freely and are
squeezed between
others. People are
pushed around.
A critical density has
built up in the crowd.
Injuries can easily
happen.
Police should take over control in close consultation
with the crowd management. Appropriate
contingency plans must be applied. Evacuation is
strongly advised. Communication with the crowd is
crucial. Emergency forces must be in the most
crowded areas, in order to provide first aid whenever
needed.
5 People disrespect
fences or try to get
out of the area.
The situation is critical
and likely to get out
of control.
Communicate with the crowd and evacuate it.
Provide help and first aid. Inform hospitals and
additional emergency units about the possibility that
the situation may get out of control.
6 Crowd turbulence
occurs. People
scream or shout for
help.
Injuries and fatalities
are likely. A crowd
disaster can happen
any time.
Calm down the crowd and guide it. Continue to
evacuate people. Watch out for the areas with the
highest densities and largest crowd movements, to
ensure support and first aid. Additional emergency
vehicles must be called to ensure sufficient
manpower, and hospitals must be informed about
likely (and potentially many) injuries.
7 People are falling to
the ground. People
raise arms into the air.
People are in big
trouble. Many injuries
are to be expected. A
crowd disaster is
(most likely)
happening.
Immediate help and first aid are needed, probably for
many people. Hospitals must be prepared to shift
from routine to large-scale emergency operation.
8 People crawl over
others.
A crowd disaster has
probably happened.
Apply rules for a state of serious emergency.
Note that at each of these levels, one must already take first preparations for the next one or two (as the situation may
change quickly) and communicate the possible scenarios and their implications to all relevant stakeholders. The goal is to
de-escalate the situation and get back to lower levels of criticality.
Helbing and Mukerji EPJ Data Science 2012, 1:7 Page 30 of 40
http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/1/1/7
6.4 Advance warning signs of crowd disasters
To improve the situational awareness of crowd managers, police and emergency forces,
Table  lists a number of successive warning signs of increasingly critical crowd condi-
tions.
6.5 Emerging relevance of citizen science and further conclusions
In the subsection above, we have presented science-based suggestions for the avoidance
of crowd disasters and an organizational response to critical situations. Deriving these
conclusions largely profited from the huge amounts of materials that volunteers have pro-
vided, collected, synchronized, and ordered (according to time, locations, content, etc.).
This is, where ‘citizen science’ can play an important role. The documentation we have
seen from volunteers appears to be more transparent and complete than the information
provided by public institutions, and it is better accessible than news from many public
and private media (where we often faced the issue that materials could not be retrieved
anymore, at least not under the original links).
Also, scientific institutions would not have had enough resources to do all the documen-
tation work that was performed by these volunteers. However, the collected materials are
so voluminous that one can hardly see the wood for the trees. Therefore, citizen science
can largely benefit from an interaction with academic experts. Specialized knowledge is
needed to distinguish more relevant from less relevant factors, to interpret empirical ev-
idence, and distinguish more likely from less likely explanations. Besides providing this
knowledge, our work also highlights the general and systemic nature of crowd disasters,
and it reveals the instabilities (amplification effects) and cascading effects leading to them.
The systemic nature of many crowd disasters makes their legal handling very difficult,
since it is hard to determine the fraction of responsibility that different people and institu-
tions had. However, without a proper response to such systemic failures, people are losing
their trust in public institutions, and this undermines their legitimacy.
Crowd disasters are not the only systemic risk, resulting from interactions and institu-
tional settings that are not suitably designed. The financial crisis is another example,,
for which nobody seems to be willing to take responsibility. This is mainly, because the
individual contributions to it cannot be well quantified. Also human history is full of ex-
amples of humanitarian disasters, which happened because nobody felt sufficiently re-
sponsible for them. The authors are convinced that the division of responsibility itself is
the problem, and that this calls for political and regulatory attention. Scientists could per-
haps make a major contribution to the cultural heritage of humanity, if they managed to
find new ways to address this fundamental problem [].
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16:33:55 joelooo1 1 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rVvUl1LVEwQ
16:34:49 joelooo1 2 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mw4W6z_wWcM
16:34:51 xfugox http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=arncFs1DU0k
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16:35:11 pizzamanne 2 [from 16:35] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aQuTaMbS38
16:35:19 Deepkisses [from 16:23] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3XFTVWUN8nw
16:35:32 dirkbvb74-2 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1toPUusRGU
16:36:09 MarkusLedwig http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3ik6n2BPa8
16:37:06 Ko0rn http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m597wnEMUTo
16:37:11 xetxetzxetz 16:38 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo97xHkHh3w
16:37:36 Cenobite1988 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UqV3Nx0MFh4
16:37:44 real02 3/3 http://www.myvideo.de/watch/7673480/Massenpanik_Loveparade2010_3_3
16:37:57 GSayMusic http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kUEB4OcsoRM (removed)
16:37:58 Klabauter0815 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1usiOJRWDU (removed)
16:38:16 Goonies11000 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dReLGi1lnc
16:38:23 pizzamanne 2 [from 16:38] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aQuTaMbS38
16:38:28 aggrostar69 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2onoJLq2-8
16:38:50 dirkbvb74-3 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWXXDEZ4oKg
16:39:01 Deepkisses 2 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3XFTVWUN8nw
16:39:20 SpaceCommander77 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLdhwP4_IXM
16:39:26 FrEaKyLaDiiiEs http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1la2QTDBPU
16:39:38 GoofyMcPott http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOjNklbvxA8
16:41:27 pizzamanne 3 [from 16:41] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DvH1BYFVCQ
16:41:40 SKAKnabe http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prXmQBf27WI (removed).
37 Collection of synchronized videos by ‘pizzamanne’ (potentially incorrect time stamp on videos in brackets):
1017 - ca. 15:38 (15:38 / 15:38:38) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGd1N6_hm1k
1019 - ca. 15:58 (15:58 / 15:58) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vdJzV26tL78
1022 - ca. 16:07 (16:07 / 16:07:12) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_LfccdiSN0
1024 - ca. 16:08 (16:08; 16:08:49) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4f8AMEstkM
1029 - ca. 16:11 (16:11 / 16:11:53) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Zsmr9CelDY
1033 - ca. 16:15 (16:15 / 16:15:36) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gJP2QVbwVs
1034 - ca. 16:17 (16:17 / 16:17) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pweaCIXTs5U
1035 - ca. 16:18 (16:18 / 16:18) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f00Mx8MY6y8
1037 - 16:22:55 (16:22 / 16:22:54) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lkc7zgPv8y0
1038 - 16:24:49 (16:24 / 16:24:48) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wpVvSWa4_8
1039 - 16:28:24 (16:28 / 16:28:24) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmEcLa4OfvU
1040 - 16:30:33 (16:30 / 16:30:34) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ra_j4kTOqqE
1041 - 16:35:11 (16:35 / 16:35:12) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYjlXhPcF4s
1043 - ca. 16:37 (16:37 / 16:37) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Od-DGsPlues
1044 - 16:38:22 (? / 16:38:24) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3qlzW-B9OM
1054 - 16:59:23 (16:59 / 16:59:35) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uk9BXDdGJoQ
1055 - ca. 17:04:43 (?) (17:04 / 17:04:43) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUBjVtjwl3o
1056 - ca. 17:06 (17:06 / 17:06) - Schnipsel von 1 Sek. - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCyzQ4NgVBU
1057 - 17:08:40 (17:08 / 17:08:50) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJ4NdwXa0Os
1058 - ca. 17:23 (17:23 / 17:23) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyC1YvwbEc
1065 - ca. 20:38 (20:38 / 20:38:35) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEFnUi5w7gs
1067 - ca. 20:47 (20:47 / 20:46:55) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZsUHVV_k3r0
1068 - ca. 20:49 (20:49 / 20:49:31) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3UYacod0w6g.
38 Collection of synchronized multi-view videos, by ‘pizzamanne’:
Part 1 (15:20-16:25): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9cbqu5sEE0
Part 2 (16:25-16:34): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDJaAvF0l7s
Part 3 (16:34-16:44): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sBE79UoxCF4
Part 4 (16:44-16:54): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJscpcZC45s
Part 5 (16:54-17:05): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vooMCrcOXGs
Part 6 (17:05-17:20): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOx_VHJd6G4.
39 Video collection of ‘kaydee271’:
1/8 - ca. 15:25 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fT7qKC8QOw
2/8 - ca. 15:35 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrpYKGNlhdw
3/8 - 17:03:34 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoxPIvrFCNg
4/8 - 17:05:14 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3_3UIZS3dw
5/8 - 17:09:41 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kc8wEMiOxoo
6/8 - 17:11:19 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gN4NNmxtRU4
7/8 - 17:12:08 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfaLr_Y4U18
8/8 - 17:15:15 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYXQLgd_VA8.
40 Video collection of ‘tr1nd’ (‘Backtony’):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vAxOeGUCZNI.
41 Video collection of ‘real02’:
3/3 - 16:37:44 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IdtR4Ks_n6I, also at
http://www.myvideo.de/watch/7673480/Massenpanik_Loveparade2010_3_3
1/3 - 16:58:19 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dP-5VOCU30U, also at
http://www.myvideo.de/watch/7673149/Massenpanik_Loveparade2010_1_3,
2/3 - 17:05:52 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvXwrbCjgf4, also at
http://www.myvideo.de/watch/7673325/Massenpanik_Loveparade2010_2_3.
42 Video collection of ‘hitower78’:
1 - 16:36:17 (16:08:43 / 16:36:21 [16:37:27]) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ioEPdfvZdw
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2 - 16:50:23 (16:22:49 / 16:50:27) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2r1AFSuHNI
3 - 16:52:33 (16:24:59 / 16:52:37) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IEtFZVOjsK4.
43 Video collection of ‘Todesparade2010’:
1/10 - 16:15:52 (16:16) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVpkclRCXaQ
2/10 - ca. 16:22 (16:23) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFxyl9OaqHk
3/10 - 16:24:12 (16:25) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PQqBePT6ig
4/10 - 16:26:07 (16:27) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=so6-7Ezeo3U
5/10 - ca. 16:29 (16:30) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VohMiM54wpA
6/10 - 16:29:44 (16:31) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WTiQ131QejE
7/10 - ca. 16:31 (16:32) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qnZGcnWyJOM
8/10 - ca. 16:33 (16:34) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cVyb3W-GAM
9/10 - ca. 16:52 (16:53) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPZiHkZQH98
10/10 - ca. 16:53 (16:54) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Pl1dVP8bA4.
44 Video collection of ‘goonies11000’:
1 - 16:38:15 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dReLGi1lnc
2 - 16:55:51 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9wfsupvD24
3 - 16:59:41 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzz5geLWPV4
4 - 17:18:35 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbQr5yAjqxs.
45 Video collection of ‘coolwojtek’:
1 - 16:29:12 (16:28:42) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wsOyIBCMExM
2 - 16:44:44 (16:44:14) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aTXT3ht8VU
3 - 16:48:34 (16:48:04) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lHLIn78650
4 - 16:51:02 (16:50:32) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKo3rb5R_Dc
5 - 16:54:36 (15:53:36) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxd_KlaCiNY.
46 Video collection of ‘mbreezer’:
Summary - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OfQjXi3J3ns
0 - 16:38:36 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5uio5rSv520
1 - 16:47:31 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgvG2Pp7yfc
2 - 16:51:41 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofFd928JY6k
3 - 16:53:07 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3aodLRaPu0E
4 - 16:53:50 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8N3ZcqOgfU
5 - 16:55:05 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdblWBmaM4Q
6 - 17:00:30 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTF0v-WY934
7 - 17:02:47 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V-WKhjRMcRM
8 - 17:03:11 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s2ywRwxfHbo
9 - 17:05:48 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52KPyHrqkwY.
47 Video collection of ‘The1art1of1hell’:
1 - 16:59:05 (16-58-09) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxIZwvvhpp8
2 - 17:03:28 (17-02-30) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbCrmUZeJoY
3 - 17:05:38 (17-03-33) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLC3vyp0b9U
4 - 17:07:30 (17-05-42) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QcAVAYDolKc
5 - 17:08:48 (17-07-34) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-iCA6g984aY
6 - 17:09:52 (17-08-51) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXLuoqNDJ-A
7 - 17:11:26 (17-09-31) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7WDbM4EonY
8 - 17:12:28 (17-11-30) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCRGtjcbyw8
9 - 17:13:47 (17-12-32) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEa9_k-Th7U
10 - 17:14:50 (17-13-51) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CiEkTPk9BQ.
48 Video collection of ‘rkjorge70’:
1 - 17:10:44 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nb0m_n0KGms
2 - 17:13:26 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQbto4MNqOU
3 - 17:19:41 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WR56iEfBQoo.
49 Pictures of the Love Parade in Berlin, see:
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?s=dabeccde05e177be86cfa1009c0e245e&p=60946437&
postcount=44.
50 See http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltjugendtag_2005,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marienfeld,
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Marienfeld_%28World_Youth_Day%29?uselang=de.
51 The event was politically desired, see http://www.duisboard.de/forum/index.php?page=Thread&postID=113125.
52 For a photograph of the triangular fences see
http://loveparade2010doku.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/googlemaps_bauzaeune_rampe.jpg.
53 Foodstand on the ramp, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhFoNb_lsO4 and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dP-5VOCU30U.
54 Obstacles on the ramp and change of police shifts, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sBEIur_lBuw,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AN_8zwycDY0.
55 Visitor forecast of Lopavent from July 8, 2010, see
http://loveparade2010doku.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/bewegungsmodell.jpg,
http://loveparade2010doku.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/bewegungsmodell.pdf, and the endnote14.
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56 The operation of the access points (isolating devices) can been seen in this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTbJ_vbT8Cw The video also mentions communication problems and that the
emergency units were not prepared for such a disaster.
57 Aerial photographs of the Love Parade in Duisburg, see
http://www.aerophoto.de/album.php?id=20100724%2018%201%20Loveparade_2010&language=0.
58 Video of the crowd on the festival area, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bd81KIpuVc8 and the recordings of
surveillance camera 4.33
59 G. K. Still, Duisburg - 24th July 2010, Love Parade Incident, see
http://www.derwesten-recherche.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Still-Gutachten.pdf.
60 Interview with the organizer of the Love Parade, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wsIvv6GQVkg.
61 Estimated inflows and outflows based on videos of surveillance camera 13 are provided at
http://loveparade2010doku.wordpress.com/2011/08/06/bewegungsmodell/.
62 Surveillance videos of the ramp can be seen at:
14:00-14:20: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJ28eiBoS0g
14:20-14:40: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FMgs_y8_Ftg
14:40-15:00: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wx2GlfGCHo4
15:00-15:20: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzrzMU8L3TY
15:20-15:40: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbdDmlYYb8c
15:40-16:00: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xgt9fh841P4
16:00-16:20: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIhGnrR6Utc
16:20-16:40: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpzISdBE3dA.
63 Change in police shift, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGPrzaxsD7I&list=UUlmsa1MvDRyVXsvCld8LMzQ&index=2&feature=plcp.
64 Police cordon in the Western tunnel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-YX7tvcVYw,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_exvp1NMjw, and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jXcTJfmS7RQ.
65 Formation of police cordon 3 in the middle of the ramp, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W5BOam3eGxA
and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joBsBYcGVsw.
66 Queues are forming on both sides of the narrowing created by triangular fences on the ramp, when police forces
start to control in- and outflows, thereby creating a bottleneck, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIhGnrR6Utc, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W5BOam3eGxA, and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joBsBYcGVsw.
67 The second police cordon in the Eastern tunnel opens up, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SGx1hsOmm_M
and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIhGnrR6Utc.
68 First visitors are entering the festival area via the narrow staircase, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KaDoWMAZYyo and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CEnjxQBmf4.
69 Security people prevent a flow of people on the staircase, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFxyl9OaqHk.
70 The first police cordon in the Western tunnel opens up, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osLQIVR--fU.
71 First people are climbing the pole, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDOlXcobbJM,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MvlzywaFnmc, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SXgp3VlM88.
72 The third police cordon dissolves, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PQqBePT6ig and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpzISdBE3dA.
73 Visitors are using the small staircase to get up to the festival areas, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=so6-7Ezeo3U.
74 Someone has climbed a traffic sign, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=so6-7Ezeo3U#t=2m41s.
75 A fourth police cordon is formed in the upper area of the ramp, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ignCf7-BnBg.
76 Crowd shouting ‘Die Mauer muss weg!’ [‘We must get rid of the wall (cordon)!’], see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Opd0rZVsspQ.
77 Jamming on the upper part of the ramp, where visitors try to enter the festival area, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WcQ21EmK7u0 [Kamera 12 (14:00-14:20)]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJ28eiBoS0g [Kamera 13 (14:00-14:20)].
78 Visitors climb the slopes to reach the festival area from the ramp, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5IB6N6cSVxA.
79 According to the YouTube description, a policeman says: ‘The venue is full.’, and people overcome fences to get to
the festival area from the tunnel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOjjW7Jp_Uw and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jm-ScKTV6nw.
80 Flow on staircase, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDOlXcobbJM#t=4m50s.
81 People scream for their lives, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_agoPlP_dA#t=4m22s.
82 A bent traffic sign can be seen here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDOlXcobbJM; later on, it disappeared
below the crowd, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzz5geLWPV4.
83 People shout that others should move on more quickly, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3nDQti-zDY and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3nDQti-zDY.
84 Signs of crowd turbulence around the pole, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3ik6n2BPa8.
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85 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWXXDEZ4oKg
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmQR6kgwSxA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1toPUusRGU.
86 An unconscious woman is carried over the crowd towards the staircase, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbvDLmQTED8.
87 Slowly moving crowd in the tunnel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPcH4zZtY7w.
88 Loud speaker announcement stating ‘The venue is full.’, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y85nUacO2GU.
89 Problems between staircase and tunnel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aTXT3ht8VU.
90 Many people raising their hands, hoping for help (visible in full screen mode), see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lHLIn78650.
91 An emergency vehicle enters the ramp, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKo3rb5R_Dc.
92 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VEbvBMrAG8.
93 A few people crawl on top of others, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxd_KlaCiNY.
94 Videos showing people crawling or walking on others, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JPIn5DPInB4,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_agoPlP_dA, and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OfQjXi3J3ns.
95 People climb up from the container in the South, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2B5o2wgdHcw.
96 Loveparade 2010 Disaster FullHD.mp4 16:54 - 17:03, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OfQjXi3J3ns.
97 People are pulled up from the container, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoxPIvrFCNg.
98 A woman screams for her life, see http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3D3x00DBo4gb8.
99 Many people yell for help, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxIZwvvhpp8.
100 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3_3UIZS3dw.
101 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kc8wEMiOxoo.
102 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbCrmUZeJoY.
103 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLC3vyp0b9U.
104 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgJYkNDiDCY.
105 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gN4NNmxtRU4.
106 http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3Ds2ywRwxfHbo.
107 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QcAVAYDolKc.
108 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfaLr_Y4U18.
109 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-iCA6g984aY.
110 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXLuoqNDJ-A.
111 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYXQLgd_VA8.
112 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nb0m_n0KGms.
113 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7WDbM4EonY
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCRGtjcbyw8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEa9_k-Th7U
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CiEkTPk9BQ.
114 Operation room of the city of Duisburg considers the Love Parade as success as late as 17:15, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9ILNAv0J1A and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHD8aqsCr9U.
115 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQbto4MNqOU.
116 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WR56iEfBQoo.
117 Videos of the continuation of the Love Parade after the Crowd Disaster, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz8dID-xTBo.
118 RTL documentation, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fy1NDX_nA3M.
119 Falling from staircase as assumed cause of the crowd disaster, see:
http://www.n-tv.de/panorama/Loveparade-endet-im-Unglueck-18-Menschen-sterben-article1127116.html,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IreaH16lm_c, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz8dID-xTBo.
120 Mass panic (stampede) as assumed cause of the crowd disaster, see:
http://www.focus.de/panorama/welt/loveparade-mindestens-15-tote-nach-massenpanik_aid_533916.html
http://www.welt.de/die-welt/politik/article8627956/15-Tote-bei-der-Love-Parade.html
http://www.videoportal.sf.tv/video?id=b5b05584-57b7-42fe-bbb3-5c28d96ff6aa.
121 Wrong behavior of people assumed as reason for the crowd disaster:
http://mp3-download.swr.de/swr1/bw/leute/michael-schreckenberg-stauexperte-und-panikforscher.6444m.mp3
and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YCxAfXjXom4.
122 Wikipedia article on stampedes, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stampede.
123 For information on the stampede in Baghdad on August 25. 2005, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Baghdad_bridge_stampede.
124 For information on the Chicago night club disaster on February 17, 2003, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_E2_nightclub_stampede.
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125 Early overcrowding outside the festival area, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRUlHnvJl-Q,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Opd0rZVsspQ, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aJojVY0E9A, and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTbJ_vbT8Cw. See also the endnote.128
126 Surveillance videos by the organizers of the Love Parade in Duisburg, showing the situation on the upper part of the
ramp:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WcQ21EmK7u0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9v7lPPYfBx0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M81I3-3E56w
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcqLFE_pdq0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5IB6N6cSVxA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYL-LTYapr0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SHrL2o5JY7M
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=krryGhZshg8.
127 Videos showing the overcrowded ramp and visitors moving up the slopes left and/or right of the ramp towards the
festival area:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzNrGBBw-nA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=loX7-LviRr0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AN_8zwycDY0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fjQMaO7IBmQ, and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=36YlTJTrRAc.
128 Accordingly to our notes, early crowd turbulence on the upper part of the ramp leading onto the festival area was
visible on the video http://video.web.de/watch/7678046, when we accessed it around May 9, 2011, but it does not
seem to be available in the Web anymore. According to the archive provided by the Wayback Machine at
http://www.archive.org/, this video was apparently linked to an article entitled ‘NRW erhebt schwere Vorwürfe
gegen Veranstalter von Love Parade’, which was published by web.de.
129 A float is slowly passing the ramp when people start using the slopes to get to the festival area, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1pToqkroZE and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5IB6N6cSVxA [Kamera
12 (15:20-15:40)].
130 ‘Pushers’ are people, who are supposed to put pressure on visitors to keep moving, in this case to ensure an efficient
entering into the festival area in order to avoid an obstruction of other visitors trying to get in.
131 First person climbs the container around 16:24, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PQqBePT6ig and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yjefyv8ShfY.
132 People offering help (e.g. water), see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDOlXcobbJM and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C0zLKDEglOs.
133 Group pushing to the tunnel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VEbvBMrAG8 around time 1:07.
134 ‘The staircase should have been blasted away’, see
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/loveparade-experte-zur-ungluecksursache-die-treppe-haette-man-
sprengen-muessen-1.979428-2;
http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/panorama/vermischtes/Die-Treppe-haette-man-sprengen-muessen/story/10003282.
135 For photographs of the accident area see
http://loveparade2010doku.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/ungluecksstelle-loveparade6.jpg,
http://hvg.hu/nagyitas/20100726_love_parade_duisburg_nagyitas#kep8,
http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4134/4912001905_3871745170_o.jpg. For further photographs of the Love Parade
disaster, see http://loveparade2010doku.wordpress.com/bilder/ and
http://www.wz-newsline.de/home/panorama/die-tragoedie-auf-der-loveparade-2010-1.21599.
136 Someone falling down, when trying to climb the staircase from the side, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JigIrMkWdYY, http://www.youtube.com/user/rkjorge70, and
http://www.youtube.com/user/LoveparadeDuisburg?feature=watch.
137 ‘Let us take the staircase’ (‘Wir nehmen die Treppe’), see
http://loveparade2010doku.wordpress.com/2010/07/28/loveparade-2010-zeitablauf-sperrungen-und-
durchlassungen/.
138 The flow of people on the staircase is considerably obstructed by people, who climb the staircase from the side, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-mfsxz2k2g.
139 Falling due to the turbulent waves in the crowd, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9ILNAv0J1A.
140 Domino effect in the crowd and involuntary stepping on others to survive, see
http://www.wdr.de/mediathek/html/regional/2011/07/19/lokalzeit-duisburg-loveparade.xml.
141 Crowd turbulence as assumed cause of the crowd disaster, see http://www.pressetext.com/news/20100729019.
142 Eyewitnesses describing the cause of the disaster, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b79riRVinJs and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9ILNAv0J1A.
143 For signs of crowd turbulence on lower part of the ramp see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpzISdBE3dA
[Kamera 13: 16:20-16:40], http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JigIrMkWdYY, and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2onoJLq2-8. It seems, however, that crowd turbulence occurred even earlier
in the upper part of the ramp; a video showing this with the file name http://video.web.de/watch/7678046 was
apparently linked to the following web.de article: NRW erhebt schwere Vorwürfe gegen Veranstalter von Love
Parade Video, but it is not accessible anymore.
144 Note that the fallen people in the video recording are in the shadow. Therefore, one must use full screen mode to
notice them, and one needs to watch out for arms raised in the air, seeking for help.
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145 Videos of the area where the victims were located, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WR56iEfBQoo,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbQr5yAjqxs, and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYXQLgd_VA8,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JPIn5DPInB4, and endnotes.47,48
146 http://loveparade2010doku.wordpress.com/2010/07/28/loveparade-2010-zeitablauf-sperrungen-und-
durchlassungen/ (nach 16:57, ‘Einschub’).
147 Pictures of the broken manhole, see
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xfl3rc_rtl2-100tage-loveparade-ausschnitte_news.
148 Moreover, video recordings of the situation around the emergency vehicle do not show clear evidence of turbulent
motion in its immediate neighborhood.
149 Video recordings of the situation around the emergency vehicle on the ramp, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VEbvBMrAG8, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNuh9Hk_tgM,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5mf7imNrIY, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-mfsxz2k2g,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dP-5VOCU30U, and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzz5geLWPV4.
150 For some aerial photographs of the festival area of the Love Parade in Berlin see
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?s=e6cd40536463e09d85e914ba4372578f&p=60946437&
postcount=44.
151 Private communication; for further eye witness reports see
http://loveparade2010doku.wordpress.com/2010/07/27/erinnerungen-von-augenzeugen-zusammengefasst-und-
verlinkt/.
152 Eye witness report, Anlage 68 [attachment no. 68] at
https://www.duisburg.de/ratsinformationssystem/bi/vo0050.php?__kvonr=20056110&voselect=20049862.
153 Surveillance by police and helicopter, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3_3UIZS3dw,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aQuTaMbS38, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmQR6kgwSxA and
endnote93.
154 Situation after 17:20 on the main ramp, entering of a loudspeaker vehicle, and activities in the tunnel, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgCByAtNXmY, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SqqdnzAsF60 (removed),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ffqkFOXX3AM, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4W3xb-SMDs, and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j11330qbfb4.
155 The police attempts to direct the crowd on the ramp to the upper end, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3XFTVWUN8nw.
156 This was previously prevented by fences.
157 The seriousness of the situation is not recognized, despite the extremely crowded situation around the pole, the
container, and the staircase, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9E32qAeOB0k,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2onoJLq2-8, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fL_1reQrERg,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N795HhESDkw and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OfQjXi3J3ns; also note
that most videos do not record the accident area for a long time-the filmers do not seem to notice the location
where the conditions was most critical.
158 Many visitors follow the leaving emergency vehicle up the ramp, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzz5geLWPV4 and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dP-5VOCU30U.
159 O. Ackermann et al., Patient care at the 2010 Love Parade in Duisburg, Germany: Clinical experiences, Deutsches
Ärzteblatt International 108(28/29), 483-489 (2011), see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3149288/;
see also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9ILNAv0J1A.
160 Or even several interrelated systemic instabilities (since the phenomenon of ‘crowd turbulence’ itself can be seen as
outcome of an instability of visitor flows).
161 D. Helbing (2010) Systemic Risks in Society and Economics. International Risk Governance Council (irgc), see
http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/Systemic_Risks_Helbing2.pdf.
162 In a letter dated July 22, 2009, from the (British) Royal Academy to Her Majesty, the Queen, the following explanation
was given for the financial crisis, see http://www.euroresidentes.com/empresa_empresas/carta-reina.pdf: ‘. . .where
was the problem? Everyone seemed to be doing their own job properly on its own merit. And according to
standard measures of success, they were often doing it well. The failure was to see how collectively this added up to
a series of interconnected imbalances over which no single authority had jurisdiction. . . . Individual risks may rightly
have been viewed as small, but the risk to the system as a whole was vast.’ This quote illustrates the mechanism of
systemic instability quite well (which may be defined as a situation in which things can get totally out of control,
even when everyone is trying to do his or her job in an adequate way).
163 http://www.metropoleruhr.de/en/home/ruhr-metropolis/data-facts.html.
164 Some tolerable risks associated with the normal entering and leaving of the area are mentioned, but have not been
investigated in detail by computer simulations.
165 Jamming due to the later start of the Love Parade and criticism of the lack of flow separation, see
http://www.wdr.de/mediathek/html/regional/2010/07/26/lokalzeit-duisburg-loveparade-floatveranstalter.xml.
166 The emergency forces were not prepared for the large number of injuries, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTbJ_vbT8Cw.
167 Police supports people moving up the narrow staircase from 16:35, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYjlXhPcF4s.
168 A. Johansson, Data-DrivenModeling of Pedestrian Crowds (VDM Publishers Dr. Mueller, 2009), see
http://tud.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/2090/dissertation_johansson_tudresden.pdf and also
http://www.crowdvision.co.uk.
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169 Comparison of the flow organization of the Love Parade (characterized by counterflows) with an alternative, circular
flow concept, see
http://loveparade2010doku.wordpress.com/2010/07/28/das-umgesetzte-wegekonzept-der-loveparade-2010-
und-eine-von-vielen-moglichen-alternativen-im-vergleich/.
170 People do not seem to panic easily, but panic mainly appears to occur when people are suddenly shocked (e.g. by a
gun shot) or the danger is imminent. If there is time to think, panic is less likely. For example, when the ‘Titanic’ sank
slowly, evacuation attempts were largely controlled by social norms, while selfish rescue attempts dominated, when
the ‘Lusitania’ sank quickly, see B.S. Frey, D.A. Savage, and B. Torgler, Interaction of natural survival instincts and
internalized social norms exploring the Titanic and Lusitania disasters, PNAS 107, 4862-4865 (2010).
171 An example for a crowd crush is the crowd disaster in Minsk, Belarus, on May 30, 1999, where a sudden
thunderstorm with heavy rain caused people to stream into the near-by ‘Nyamiha’ metro station, see
http://www.charonboat.com/item/79 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Metro.
172 An example of crowd panic is the Baghdad bridge stampede on August 31, 2005, where pilgrims moving toward
the Al Kadhimiya Mosque got nervous due to rumors of an imminent suicide bomb attack, after there had been
already armed conflict on the same day, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Baghdad_bridge_stampede.
173 Such turbulent waves are also often observed during rock concerts, when the crowd is very dense.
174 Mitarbeiter der Stadt Duisburg werden angefeindet [Staff of the City of Duisburg publicly attacked], see
http://www.derwesten.de/staedte/duisburg/mitarbeiter-der-stadt-duisburg-werden-angefeindet-id3319267.html.
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